1981 (3) TMI 267 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the execution application was barred by limitation.
2. Applicability of the doctrine of constructive res judicata.
3. Validity of objections filed by third parties claiming ownership of the properties under execution.
4. The effect of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act on the rights of transferees pendente lite.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Whether the execution application was barred by limitation:
The decree-holder filed a second execution application on March 14, 1966, which was more than six years after the dismissal of the first execution application on August 24, 1957. According to Article 182 of the Limitation Act, 1908, the period of limitation for a second execution application is three years from the date of the final order on the first execution application. Therefore, the court held that the execution application was clearly barred by limitation. The Supreme Court's decision in Prem Lata's case (AIR 1970 SC 1525) clarified that Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not supersede the law of limitation regarding the execution of decrees, and each application for execution must be made within three years from the dates mentioned in Article 182.

2. Applicability of the doctrine of constructive res judicata:
The decree-holder argued that the judgment-debtor was precluded by the doctrine of constructive res judicata from raising the plea of limitation, as no objection was filed by the judgment-debtor or his heirs after being served with notice under Order XXI, Rule 22, C.P.C. The court, however, found that this doctrine did not apply in this case because the judgment-debtor and his heirs did not file any objections, and the issue of constructive res judicata did not arise on the facts of the case.

3. Validity of objections filed by third parties claiming ownership of the properties under execution:
Four sets of objections were filed by third parties claiming ownership of portions of the properties under execution. These objections were based on sale deeds executed by the judgment-debtor or his family members after the expiration of the limitation period for the execution of the decree. The court found that these objectors did not claim title through the judgment-debtor and were not his representatives. They were in the position of holders of title paramount and could validly raise objections to the execution proceedings. Their objections were treated under Section 151 C.P.C., and the court held that the execution was time-barred, thus releasing the properties from the sale proceedings.

4. The effect of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act on the rights of transferees pendente lite:
Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act codifies the doctrine of lis pendens, which restricts the transfer of property during the pendency of a suit or proceeding. However, this restriction ceases once the period of limitation for the execution of the decree expires. In this case, the limitation period expired on August 24, 1960, and the subsequent transfers of the properties by the judgment-debtor were not bound by the decree. The court held that a transferee from the judgment-debtor after the execution of the decree became barred by time cannot be considered a representative of the judgment-debtor and can raise all available pleas to protect their interest.

Conclusion:
The court allowed the revisions in part, releasing properties Nos. 110 to 128 from the sale proceedings in favor of the respective objectors. The execution court was directed to proceed to confirm the sale of the remaining properties (Nos. 102 to 109 and the ice factory) in accordance with the law, as no objections were filed regarding these properties. The parties were directed to bear their own costs.