1990 (12) TMI 336 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues:
Violation of S. 33(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; Barred by Limitation

Analysis:

Violation of S. 33(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947:
The complaint alleged that the accused, the Secretary of a company, contravened S. 33(1) by closing the company's establishment in Bombay without obtaining necessary permission. The complaint was authorized by the appropriate government, and the accused challenged the order of process issued by the Magistrate. The dispute arose due to the management's decision to close the Bombay establishment and transfer employees to Bangalore. The complainant argued that the closure altered workmen's conditions without proper authorization, violating S. 33(1) of the Act. The accused contended that the complaint was barred by limitation, citing the provisions of S. 31 of the Act, which prescribe penalties for contravention of S. 33. The accused argued that the complaint was filed after the limitation period, thus challenging the legality of the process issued by the Magistrate.

Barred by Limitation:
The accused claimed that the complaint was time-barred, as it was filed after the limitation period specified under S. 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The complainant initially stated the closure date as June 14, 1985, but later corrected it to July 3, 1985. The prosecution argued that the period for obtaining government sanction should be excluded from the limitation period, thus making the complaint timely. However, the court held that S. 34 of the Industrial Disputes Act mandates complaints to be made by or under the authority of the appropriate government, not requiring government consent for prosecution. Drawing parallels with other statutes requiring government consent for prosecution, the court rejected the argument that government sanction was necessary in this case. Citing a previous judgment, the court upheld that the prosecution cannot claim exclusion of time for obtaining government authorization, thereby ruling in favor of the accused and quashing the complaint.

In conclusion, the court ruled that the complaint lodged against the accused for violating S. 33(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act was time-barred and lacked the necessary authorization, leading to the quashing of the process issued by the Magistrate.