1912 (8) TMI 1 - HC - Income Tax

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of certiorari beyond its original jurisdiction.
2. Whether the Divisional Officer acted as a Court under the Income Tax Act.
3. Availability of alternative remedies for the petitioner.
4. Validity of the Divisional Officer's order due to the timing of its issuance.
5. Appropriateness of exercising discretion to quash the Divisional Officer's proceedings.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Jurisdiction of the High Court to Issue a Writ of Certiorari Beyond Its Original Jurisdiction:
The Court examined whether it had the power to issue a writ of certiorari on an officer outside its original jurisdiction. The judgment referred to Section 9 of the High Courts Charter Act, which outlines the jurisdiction and authority of the High Court. The Court concluded that the High Court does not have the power to issue a writ of certiorari beyond the limits of its original jurisdiction, as neither the Charter Act nor the Letters Patent of the High Court expressly conferred such power. The Court discussed the historical context and jurisdictional limits of the Supreme Court and the Recorder's Court, emphasizing that the Supreme Court's powers were confined to British subjects and did not extend to issuing writs of certiorari in cases like the present one.

2. Whether the Divisional Officer Acted as a Court Under the Income Tax Act:
The Court analyzed whether the Divisional Officer acted as a Court while hearing appeals under the Income Tax Act. It was determined that the Divisional Officer, in deciding the Income Tax appeal, acted as a Court. The Court referred to previous judgments and legal principles, noting that the Divisional Officer had the authority to receive evidence and decide on the matter, which aligned with the functions of a Court. The decision was influenced by the fact that the appeal process involved a lis (dispute) between the petitioner and the government, and the officer had to adjudicate on the proper assessment of the petitioner's income.

3. Availability of Alternative Remedies for the Petitioner:
The Court considered whether the petitioner should have appealed to the Revenue Board to get the Divisional Officer's order set aside. It was concluded that the petitioner had no other remedy. The Court found that the Revenue Board did not have the jurisdiction to set aside the Divisional Officer's order under Section 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code, as the Divisional Officer acted as a Revenue Court and not merely in his capacity as an Income Tax Officer.

4. Validity of the Divisional Officer's Order Due to the Timing of Its Issuance:
The Court addressed whether the Divisional Officer's order was invalid due to being issued long after the closure of the Income Tax proceedings. The judgment acknowledged a conflict of judicial opinion on this matter but leaned towards the view that the timing of the order did not constitute a complete absence of jurisdiction. The Court referred to the Full Bench decision in Aiyakannu Pillai v. Emperor, which held that a Court must pass an order under Section 476 as part of the proceedings in which the offense was committed. Despite this, the Court did not find the delay in issuing the order sufficient to quash the proceedings.

5. Appropriateness of Exercising Discretion to Quash the Divisional Officer's Proceedings:
The Court deliberated on whether it was appropriate to exercise its discretion to quash the Divisional Officer's proceedings. The Court concluded that even if it had the power to interfere, this was not a case that warranted such intervention. The petitioner could raise objections regarding the alleged illegality of the Divisional Officer's action before the Criminal Court trying him for perjury. The Court emphasized that it was not inclined to encourage technical objections that would prevent the merits of the case from being examined.

Conclusion:
The petitions were dismissed on the grounds that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari beyond its original jurisdiction, the Divisional Officer acted as a Court under the Income Tax Act, there were no alternative remedies available to the petitioner, the timing of the order did not invalidate it, and it was not a proper case for exercising discretion to quash the proceedings.