1961 (1) TMI 96 - SC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the termination of services of the appellants by the Executive Council of Banaras Hindu University.
2. Applicability and precedence of Ordinance No. 6 versus Statute No. 30.
3. Compliance with procedural requirements under Statute No. 30.
4. Legality of the Executive Council's actions in light of pending judicial proceedings.
5. Allegations of mala fide actions by the Executive Council.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Validity of the termination of services of the appellants by the Executive Council of Banaras Hindu University:

The appellants challenged the termination of their services by the Executive Council through Resolutions Nos. 90, 94 to 96, and 99 to 102. The Supreme Court found that the Executive Council's actions were ultra vires. The Court quashed the resolutions, stating that the Executive Council did not exercise its powers correctly under the Statutes and Ordinances.

2. Applicability and precedence of Ordinance No. 6 versus Statute No. 30:

The appellants argued that the Executive Council could not take recourse to Ordinance No. 6 after initiating action under Statute No. 30. The Court agreed, noting that Ordinance No. 6 was subordinate to Statute No. 30 and could not prevail where Statute No. 30 applied. The Court emphasized that Statute No. 30 was enacted by Parliament to address special circumstances and contained a specific code for dealing with certain cases, thereby excluding the applicability of Ordinance No. 6 once the special procedure under Statute No. 30 had been invoked.

3. Compliance with procedural requirements under Statute No. 30:

The Court found that the procedural requirements under Statute No. 30 were not fully complied with. The Executive Council had started action under Statute No. 30, which involved scrutiny by the Solicitor-General and the Reviewing Committee. However, the Executive Council abandoned this procedure midcourse and terminated the services under Ordinance No. 6 instead. The Court held that once the special procedure under Statute No. 30 was adopted, it could not be abandoned in favor of other powers.

4. Legality of the Executive Council's actions in light of pending judicial proceedings:

The appellants in Group I had obtained a stay from the High Court of Allahabad against action under Statute No. 30, and the Executive Council had resolved to postpone consideration of their cases. Despite this, the Executive Council terminated their services on the same day. The Court found this contradictory and held that the Executive Council's actions were illegal, as they deprived the appellants of the right to show cause against the allegations or findings of the Reviewing Committee.

5. Allegations of mala fide actions by the Executive Council:

The appellants characterized the Executive Council's actions as mala fide and a fraud upon the University Act and Statute No. 30. The Court, however, did not find sufficient evidence to support the allegations of malice or indirect motives. The Court focused on the legality of the actions and concluded that the error lay in the Executive Council's belief that it had cumulative or alternative powers even after adopting the special procedure under Statute No. 30.

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, quashing the impugned resolutions of the Executive Council dated May 15, 1960. The Court issued appropriate writs to this effect and ordered the respondents to pay the costs of the appeals and the High Court proceedings. The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to the procedural requirements and the precedence of Statute No. 30 over Ordinance No. 6 in the given circumstances.