9911796707
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Issues:
1. Whether the lease was for manufacturing purposes? 2. Whether the plaintiffs require the premises bona fide for their own use & occupation and for building & rebuilding? Analysis: 1. The judgment revolves around a suit for the recovery of premises based on the plaintiffs' bona fide requirement for their own use and rebuilding. The defense raised questions the nature of the lease, specifically whether it was for manufacturing purposes. The lease agreement, dated 18-4-1929, was initially for twenty years and expired on 30-4-1946. The defendant continued as a tenant on a monthly rent basis until a notice to quit was issued on 8-3-1948. The defense argued that the lease was for manufacturing purposes, citing a clause allowing the use of the premises for setting up a press and ordinary business purposes. 2. The judgment carefully analyzed the lease agreement and the definition of manufacturing purposes under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The court concluded that the lease, which allowed for multiple uses including dwelling, setting up a press, and ordinary business purposes, did not solely qualify as a lease for manufacturing purposes. The court rejected the broad interpretation that printing activities constitute manufacturing, emphasizing that manufacturing involves the production of new or different articles. The judgment highlighted the importance of the purpose of the lease at its inception, stating that subsequent use by the tenant does not alter the original purpose of the lease. 3. The court scrutinized the evidence presented regarding the nature of activities conducted on the premises, emphasizing the absence of proof of manufacturing activities like rubber production. The judgment clarified that a lease for manufacturing purposes must be explicitly agreed upon by both parties at the time of the grant. As the lease in question did not meet the criteria for a manufacturing lease, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, granting them possession of the premises and mesne profits. The defendant was directed to continue paying mesne profits to the plaintiffs' solicitor, and the decree was not to be executed immediately to allow for a grace period.
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