1967 (2) TMI 108 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the notification and declaration under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act.
2. Allegation of vagueness in the notification and declaration.
3. Allegation of mala fide intention and colourable exercise of power by the State.
4. Petitioner's right to object under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act.
5. Respondents' duty to disclose the specific purpose of acquisition.

Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Validity of the Notification and Declaration under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act:
The Petitioner challenged the validity of the notification dated November 3, 1961, and the declaration dated June 20, 1963, under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, arguing that they were vague and did not state the public purpose clearly. The Court held that it is not necessary for the Government to provide detailed particulars in the notification specifying the projects of industrial development or the industries to be established. The Supreme Court in Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay and Arnold Rodricks v. State of Maharashtra had established that a statement indicating the land is needed for a public purpose suffices for the validity of land acquisition proceedings.

2. Allegation of Vagueness in the Notification and Declaration:
The Petitioner argued that the notification and declaration were vague, depriving him of his rights under Section 5A of the Act. The Court noted that the Petitioner did not request further information at any stage, and there was no evidence that he had asked for such information. The Court found that the notification stating the land was needed for industrial development at Asansol was sufficient and not vague.

3. Allegation of Mala Fide Intention and Colourable Exercise of Power by the State:
The Petitioner alleged that the real purpose of the acquisition was to make land available cheaply to Sen Raleigh Industries of India Limited, constituting a colourable exercise of power. The Court observed that the Land Acquisition Collector's affidavit did not adequately address this allegation. The Court emphasized that public authorities must exercise their powers in good faith and disclose specific purposes when questioned. The Court found the Respondents' failure to disclose material facts and answer the Petitioner's allegations as indicative of a potential colourable exercise of power.

4. Petitioner's Right to Object under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act:
The Petitioner claimed he was deprived of his right to object under Section 5A due to the vagueness of the notification. The Court noted that the Petitioner had already filed an objection and did not complain of a lack of particulars. The Court held that since the Petitioner did not request further particulars at the proper stage, the question of prejudice did not arise.

5. Respondents' Duty to Disclose the Specific Purpose of Acquisition:
The Court criticized the Respondents for not disclosing the specific purpose of the acquisition and for evading the Petitioner's allegations. The Court underscored that public authorities must answer questions about the specific public purpose of their actions frankly and fairly. The Court found that the Respondents' failure to provide material facts made it impossible for the Court to decide on the issue of colourable exercise of power.

Conclusion:
The appeal was allowed, and the order of the learned Judge was set aside. The Rule was made absolute without any order as to costs. The Court emphasized the Respondents' duty to disclose relevant material facts to enable the Court to make a just decision. The order was made without prejudice to the Respondents' rights to take further steps under the law for the acquisition of the land in question.