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Issues Involved:
1. Competency of the plaintiff firm to maintain the suit under Section 78, Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. 2. Limitation period for the suit based on original consideration. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Competency of the Plaintiff Firm to Maintain the Suit: The primary issue in this appeal is whether the plaintiff firm, Budh Nath Pyari Lal Das, has the right to sue for the debt under the provisions of Section 78, Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, read with Section 8 of the Act. The appellant contends that the plaintiff firm was incompetent to maintain the suit because the holder of the promissory note has not sued. The court examined whether the plaintiff firm is a separate entity or a legal person different from Pyari Lal, or if it is a comprehensive name for a number of persons, including Pyari Lal as a plaintiff. It was noted that Pyari Lal Das, the holder of the promissory note, is a member of the firm and has signed and verified the plaint. The court concluded that the firm name is merely a collective name for the individuals who are members of the partnership, and not a separate legal entity. Therefore, the holder of the promissory note, Pyari Lal Das, is indeed a plaintiff in the cause, and the suit cannot be dismissed on the ground that the holder of the promissory note is not a plaintiff. The court further elaborated that Section 78 of the Negotiable Instruments Act does not prohibit any person other than the holder to bring a suit, provided that person is the true owner and can give a good discharge to the debtor from the holder of the instrument. The court rejected the appellant's reliance on the case of Firm of Sadasuk Janhi Das v. Kishan Pershad, noting that it did not establish the converse proposition that no person other than the one who appears as a party to the instrument is entitled to sue for the money. 2. Limitation Period for the Suit Based on Original Consideration: The second issue raised by the appellant is that if the suit is considered to be based on the original consideration paid to the defendant, then it is barred by limitation, having been brought more than three years after the loan was advanced. The loan was payable to Pyari Lal Das or his order after thirty days from the date of its execution, and the suit was brought on 16th February 1924. The court observed that the issues framed in the lower court indicated that both parties understood that the suit was based on the promissory note as well as on the original consideration paid to the defendant. The court found that the plaint mentions an agreement to pay the money after 30 days, which was not challenged by the defendant, and thus must be taken as an uncontroverted fact. Consequently, the applicable article of the Limitation Act is Article 115, which provides that the cause of action accrues from the date of the breach. The court referenced the case of Rameshwar Mandal v. Ram Chand Roy to support this interpretation. Conclusion: The appeal fails on all the points raised by the appellant. The court held that the plaintiff firm, including the holder of the promissory note, is competent to maintain the suit, and the suit is not barred by limitation. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
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