1929 (11) TMI 10 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Interpretation of "making of the order" in Sections 73 and 77 of the Indian Registration Act.
2. Whether the plaintiff's application and subsequent suit were time-barred.
3. Validity and communication of orders under Sections 73 and 77.
4. Distinction between different types of orders of refusal.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Interpretation of "making of the order" in Sections 73 and 77 of the Indian Registration Act:
The primary issue revolves around the interpretation of the phrase "making of the order" as used in Sections 73 and 77 of the Indian Registration Act. The court had to decide whether this phrase refers to the date when the order was written or the date when it was communicated to the affected party. The court concluded that for an order to be valid and effective, it must be communicated to the party affected by it. The reasoning is that an order without notice or communication to the concerned party does not serve its purpose and is contrary to the principles of justice and common sense. This interpretation aligns with prior Indian and English case law, emphasizing that an order should be known to the parties to be effective.

2. Whether the plaintiff's application and subsequent suit were time-barred:
The plaintiff presented a sale deed for registration on 28th September 1926, which was refused by the Sub-Registrar on 18th October 1926. The refusal order was communicated to the plaintiff on 19th October 1926. The plaintiff then applied to the District Registrar on 18th November 1926, within 30 days of receiving the order but more than 30 days from the date of the order. The District Registrar rejected this application as time-barred on 16th December 1926. The plaintiff filed a suit on 19th January 1927, within 30 days from the date of communication of the Registrar's order but more than 30 days from the date of the order. The court held that both the application and the suit were not time-barred as the time should be computed from the date the order was communicated to the plaintiff.

3. Validity and communication of orders under Sections 73 and 77:
The court emphasized that an order must be communicated to the affected party to be valid. This principle is supported by various precedents, including Abdul Ali v. Mirja Khan and other cases under different statutes, which establish that an order is not considered made until it is communicated to the concerned party. The court rejected the argument that the statutory language "making of the order" should be interpreted strictly to mean the date of the order's writing, asserting that such an interpretation would be unjust and impractical.

4. Distinction between different types of orders of refusal:
The court addressed the argument that an order rejecting an application as time-barred is not an "order of refusal" under Section 77. It was held that the Act does not distinguish between different grounds of refusal; any order of refusal, regardless of the reason, falls under the purview of Section 77. The court cited several cases to support this view, concluding that an order dismissing a petition as time-barred is indeed an order of refusal, making the subsequent suit maintainable if the initial application was wrongly rejected as time-barred.

Conclusion:
The court dismissed the appeal, holding that the plaintiff's application and suit were filed within the permissible time limits as calculated from the date of communication of the orders. The interpretation that an order must be communicated to be effective was upheld, ensuring the plaintiff's right to challenge the refusal of registration. The judgment reinforces the principle that procedural fairness requires affected parties to be informed of decisions impacting their rights.