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Issues Involved:
1. Suppression of material facts by the appellant in her writ petition. 2. Applicability of the norms for grant of dealership as circulated by the brochure dated 1.11.2004 and compliance by respondent No. 1 - Corporation. 3. Validity and genuineness of the lease deed dated 18.3.2004 submitted by respondent No. 2. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Suppression of Material Facts by the Appellant: The Division Bench accepted the finding of the learned Single Judge that there was no suppression of material facts by the writ petitioner, the appellant. It was noted that it was not a requirement of the advertisement that the land documents had to be submitted along with the application. 2. Applicability of the Norms for Grant of Dealership: The Division Bench did not accept the conclusion of the learned Single Judge that was based on Clause 14 and the norms contained in the brochure dated 1.11.2004. It was held that the selection was conducted in accordance with the policy circular dated 4.9.2003, which was in force at the time of the interview/selection on 16.6.2004. The circular dated 1.11.2004, which introduced the requirement for site verification prior to the interview, was not applicable as it came into effect after the selection process was completed. 3. Validity and Genuineness of the Lease Deed: The Division Bench concluded that the lease deed dated 18.3.2004, although not registered, could still be considered genuine due to its notarization. It was held that non-registration under Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act would not affect the document's genuineness, which was established by the notary public's attestation. Consequently, it was determined that the award of 25 marks to respondent No. 2 for "capability to provide land and infrastructure/facilities" was justified and did not materially influence the end result. Additional Considerations: The learned Single Judge's decision to quash the entire selection process was deemed unnecessary. The Division Bench noted that under Clause 5.4 of the policy circular dated 4.9.2003, if the Letter of Intent (LOI) to the No. 1 candidate is cancelled, it should be given to the next candidate in the merit panel. However, since the candidates at Nos. 2 and 3 did not challenge the selection, the entire selection process should not have been set aside. Conclusion: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, emphasizing that the selection process, though flawed, did not warrant setting aside the dealership granted to respondent No. 2. The Court took into account the subsequent events, including the substantial investments made by respondent No. 2 and the public interest in maintaining the retail outlet's operation. The Court found no allegations of manipulation or undue favor towards respondent No. 2 and noted the dealership's successful operation over five years. Thus, the Supreme Court declined to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution to set aside the selection.
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