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Issues:
Assessment for the years 1933-34 and 1935-36, appeal timelines, belated applications under Section 33, interpretation of "prejudicial" in Section 66(2), limitation for revision application under Section 33, discretion of the Commissioner, time limit for applications, scope of High Court's interference, revisiting decisions, revising orders, costs assessment. Analysis: The case involves assessments for the years 1933-34 and 1935-36, with an appeal partially succeeding on the first assessment in February 1937. Discrepancies in appeal dates for the 1934-35 assessment arose, leading to confusion but deemed not material. The Commissioner dismissed belated applications under Section 33 for both assessments. The petitioner sought a mandamus, challenging the Commissioner's decision as not prejudicial, citing precedents. The Commissioner's reliance on past rulings was contested, emphasizing a recent Full Bench judgment altering the interpretation of "prejudicial" in Section 66(2). The High Court deliberated on the differing meanings of "prejudicial" in Sections 33 and 66(2), leaning towards the Full Bench's interpretation. Regarding the limitation for revision applications under Section 33, the Commissioner did not base his decision on a time limit but on the application's belated nature. The High Court highlighted that belatedness can be determined irrespective of a prescribed time limit, citing precedents from other cases. The discretion of the Commissioner in such matters was underscored, emphasizing that the Court cannot compel reconsideration of decisions based on timeliness. The petitioner contested the timing of the application, arguing it was not made after a year from the appellate order. However, the Court noted its limited scope to interfere in such factual matters, reiterating its role as not a Court of Appeal or revision. The Court emphasized that the Commissioner's decision on timeliness is within his jurisdiction and not subject to mandamus. Lastly, the Commissioner's rejection of a reference for the second assessment due to a previous decision was questioned. The Court opined that the Commissioner could still revise the order on different points not covered in the prior decision. The Court refrained from passing a final opinion on this matter, indicating the Commissioner's discretion in revising orders. Ultimately, the mandamus was refused, and costs were awarded to the Income Tax Commissioner. In conclusion, the High Court's decision centered on the interpretation of legal provisions, the Commissioner's discretion, and the limited scope of the Court's interference in administrative decisions. The judgment emphasized the importance of precedents, statutory interpretations, and the Commissioner's authority in handling revision applications and assessments under the Income Tax Act.
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