1953 (2) TMI 60 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Minority status of the Defendant at the time of the first contract.
2. Competence to contract during estate management.
3. Validity of the second contract without fresh consideration.
4. Application of Sections 65 and 68 of the Indian Contract Act.
5. Repugnancy of Notification No. 85 to Article 14 of the Constitution.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Minority Status of the Defendant at the Time of the First Contract:
The core issue was whether the Defendant was a minor when the initial Khata of Rs. 5000/- was executed on 07-02-1947. The trial court found that the Defendant was a minor, making the contract void under Section 11 of the Contract Act. The appellate court upheld this, noting that the Defendant's estate was under the Western India States Agency's management, rendering the contract void. However, the High Court noted that the Defendant admitted in cross-examination that he was born on 08-08-1928, thus completing 18 years on 08-08-1946. The High Court concluded that the Defendant was a major at the time of the Khata Ex. 7, contradicting the lower courts' findings.

2. Competence to Contract During Estate Management:
The High Court examined Notification No. 85, which stated that the owner of an estate under Agency management could not enter into any contract involving pecuniary liability, rendering such contracts void. The High Court confirmed that since the Defendant's estate was under management during the execution of Khata Ex. 7, the contract was void and could not be ratified upon attaining majority. This legal position was supported by precedents such as Govind Ram v. Piram Ditta and Nazir Ahmad v. Jiwan Das, which held that contracts entered into by minors or during estate management could not be ratified later.

3. Validity of the Second Contract Without Fresh Consideration:
The second document, Ex. 12, executed on 26-10-1949, was admitted to have no fresh consideration and was merely a renewal of the initial void contract. The High Court reiterated that a void contract could not be revived or ratified by a subsequent contract, thus rendering Ex. 12 void as well.

4. Application of Sections 65 and 68 of the Indian Contract Act:
The Appellant argued that under Section 25(2) of the Indian Contract Act, Ex. 12 should be considered as a promise to compensate for a voluntary act, i.e., the loan given for the Defendant's marriage expenses. However, the High Court dismissed this argument, noting that this case was not made in the plaint, and the Defendant had no opportunity to rebut it. The High Court also dismissed the relevance of Section 65, referencing the Privy Council's decision in Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose, which stated that Section 65 presupposes a contract between competent parties, which was not the case here. Regarding Section 68, the High Court found no evidence that the loan was necessary for the Defendant's marriage expenses, thus rejecting the claim for reimbursement from the Defendant's property.

5. Repugnancy of Notification No. 85 to Article 14 of the Constitution:
The Appellant contended that Notification No. 85 was repugnant to Article 14 of the Constitution, arguing it denied creditors equality before the law. The High Court rejected this contention, stating that the classification was reasonable and necessary to protect impecunious Talukdars and their estates from debt, ensuring the estate remained intact until the Talukdar reached a suitable age. The classification was deemed not discriminatory and did not violate Article 14, referencing cases such as Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India and Kathi Raning v. State of Saurashtra.

Conclusion:
The High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the lower courts' decisions that the contracts were void due to the Defendant's minority status and the estate's management, and rejecting the applicability of Sections 65 and 68 of the Indian Contract Act. The contention regarding the repugnancy of Notification No. 85 to Article 14 was also dismissed. The judgment emphasized the legal principles surrounding the void nature of contracts entered into by minors or during estate management and the inability to ratify such contracts upon attaining majority.