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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the accused, Jagatsingh, was a public servant within the meaning of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 43 of the Road Transport Corporation Act. 2. Whether the ingredients of Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code, with which Jagatsingh had been charged, were proved. Detailed Analysis: Issue 1: Whether the accused, Jagatsingh, was a public servant within the meaning of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 43 of the Road Transport Corporation Act. The trial court acquitted Jagatsingh, holding that he was not a public servant within the meaning of Section 43 of the Road Transport Corporation Act. This section states that all officers and servants of a corporation are deemed to be public servants "when acting or purporting to act in pursuance of the provisions of this Act or of any other law." The trial court concluded that taking a bribe cannot be considered as acting or purporting to act under the provisions of the Act or any other law. The Supreme Court agreed with this interpretation, noting that the language of Section 43 clearly limits the status of public servants to those acting in accordance with the Act or any other law. Since taking a bribe does not fall under these actions, Jagatsingh could not be considered a public servant under Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code as it stood at the time of the offense. The court acknowledged the unfortunate consequence that officers and servants of corporations could evade prosecution for bribery under the existing legal framework but noted that this issue was rectified by the subsequent amendment to Section 21. Issue 2: Whether the ingredients of Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code, with which Jagatsingh had been charged, were proved. The High Court had relied on the Supreme Court's decision in State of Ajmer v. Shivjilal to acquit Jagatsingh, reasoning that the charge did not specify the other public servant who was to be approached for rendering service or disservice. The Supreme Court clarified that the High Court misinterpreted Shivjilal's case. In Shivjilal's case, the charge required specifying the other public servant because the accused had no direct role in the appointment process and could only influence it by approaching another public servant. However, in the present case, Jagatsingh was employed in the very office responsible for making the appointment. Therefore, the relevant part of Section 161 applicable here is: "Whoever, being a public servant, accepts or obtains, or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person for himself or for any other person, any gratification whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavour to any person." The Supreme Court concluded that since Jagatsingh was in the office responsible for the appointment and took money to secure the job, it was not necessary to specify another public servant in the charge. The High Court's reliance on Shivjilal's case was misplaced, and the acquittal on this ground was incorrect. Conclusion: The Supreme Court ultimately dismissed the appeal, upholding the acquittal of Jagatsingh and Sheikh Ahmed but for different reasons. The trial court's decision that Jagatsingh was not a public servant under the applicable law at the time was affirmed, rendering the charge under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code inapplicable. Consequently, Sheikh Ahmed was also acquitted.
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