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Issues Involved:
1. Granting or refusal of temporary injunction. 2. Applicability of Section 4 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988. 3. Admission by a party in previous pleadings. 4. Balance of convenience and irreparable injury. Detailed Analysis: 1. Granting or Refusal of Temporary Injunction: The appellant filed an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(r) of the Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C.) against the order dismissing his application for a temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. The plaintiff sought a temporary injunction to restrain the respondent from constructing structures or alienating the suit schedule properties. The court cited the principles laid down in Rangamma v. Krishnappa (1968 (1) Mys. L.J. 552), stating that the granting or refusal of a temporary injunction rests on the sound exercise of discretion by the court. The appellate court should not interfere unless the discretion exercised by the lower court is unreasonable or capricious. 2. Applicability of Section 4 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988: The lower court relied on Section 4 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, which prohibits any suit or claim to enforce a right in respect of property held benami. The appellant contended that the properties, though standing in the respondent's name, were purchased for the joint family and thus fell under Exception (a) to Sub-section (3) of Section 4, which allows claims if the property is held for the benefit of coparceners in a Hindu undivided family. However, the court noted that the appellant failed to produce material evidence to prove this claim at the stage of the hearing of I.A. No. 1. Therefore, the lower court rightly held that prima facie Section 4 of the Act would aid the respondent. 3. Admission by a Party in Previous Pleadings: The appellant argued that the respondent had admitted in a previous suit (O.S. No. 134 of 1988) that the properties were joint family properties. The court referred to Basant Singh v. Janaki Singh (MANU/SC/0284/1966), which held that admissions in pleadings could be used as evidence in other suits but are not conclusive and can be shown to be incorrect. Similarly, Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Iccharam (MANU/SC/0417/1973) reaffirmed that judicial admissions in pleadings are binding but can be contested. Therefore, the admission by the respondent in the previous suit does not conclusively prove the appellant's case. 4. Balance of Convenience and Irreparable Injury: The court examined whether the appellant established a prima facie case and whether there was a balance of convenience or irreparable injury. Citing Purna Investments Ltd. v. Southern Steelmet and Alloys Ltd. (1977 (2) KLJ 266), the court emphasized that the burden of proof lies on the applicant to show that the inconvenience caused by the refusal of the injunction is greater than that caused to the respondent if granted. The court also referred to Life Insurance Corporation v. Bangalore L.I.C. Employees Housing Co-op. Society Ltd. (MANU/KA/0310/1988), which highlighted the need for the court to ensure that the questions raised are not vexatious and merit serious consideration. The court concluded that the appellant failed to establish a prima facie case and that the balance of convenience did not favor granting the injunction. The respondent's undertaking not to cause injury to the appellant's water pipeline and electrical supply further diminished the appellant's claim of irreparable injury. Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed, with the court affirming that the lower court correctly exercised its discretion in denying the temporary injunction. The appellant failed to establish a prima facie case, and there was no irreparable injury or balance of convenience favoring the appellant. The judgment emphasized the principles governing the granting of temporary injunctions and the applicability of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988.
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