1983 (2) TMI 329 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Limitation period for filing the complaint.
2. Validity of the complaint filed by the investigating officer.
3. Interpretation of the term "complaint" under the Dowry Prohibition Act.
4. Whether the demands made constituted an offense under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Limitation Period for Filing the Complaint:
The petitioners argued that the complaint was time-barred as it was filed beyond the one-year limitation period prescribed under Section 7(b) of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The court noted that the demands were made from 27th January 1980 to 4th March 1980. The complaint was filed on 10th March 1981, which is beyond the one-year period. However, the court emphasized that the period required to obtain sanction (45 days in this case) must be excluded, as per Section 470(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Therefore, the complaint was deemed to be within the limitation period.

2. Validity of the Complaint Filed by the Investigating Officer:
The petitioners contended that under Section 7(b) of the Act, a complaint must be filed by the aggrieved party, and a report by a police officer does not qualify as a complaint. The court clarified that the Dowry Prohibition Act does not specify who can file a complaint. Unlike the provisions in the Indian Penal Code, which restrict complaints to the aggrieved party, the Act allows any person to file a complaint. The court distinguished this case from the Punjab Amendment, which required the complaint to be by an aggrieved person. Therefore, the complaint filed by the investigating officer was valid.

3. Interpretation of the Term "Complaint" under the Dowry Prohibition Act:
The court examined the definition of "complaint" under Section 2(d) of the Criminal Procedure Code, which excludes police reports. However, the Explanation to Section 2(d) states that a police report in a non-cognizable offense is deemed to be a complaint, and the police officer is deemed to be the complainant. Since the Dowry Prohibition Act does not provide specific procedures for investigation or complaint filing, the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code apply. Hence, the police report in this case is considered a complaint within the meaning of Section 7(b) of the Act.

4. Whether the Demands Made Constituted an Offense under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act:
The petitioners argued that no offense was made out as there was no giving or taking of dowry as defined under the Act. The court referred to the definition of "dowry" in Section 2 of the Act, which includes any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given as consideration for the marriage. The court distinguished this case from the Bombay High Court decision in Shankarrao Abasaheb Pawar v. L. V. Jadhav, where no agreement to give dowry was established. In the present case, the demands for money and items were made before and after the marriage, and Mr. V. D. Khanna partially complied with these demands. Therefore, a prima facie case under Section 4 of the Act was made out, and the petition was dismissed.

Conclusion:
The petition challenging the order and notice dated 7th November 1981 was dismissed. The court held that the complaint was within the limitation period, the investigating officer's report was a valid complaint, and a prima facie case under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was established. The proceedings against the petitioners were allowed to continue.