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Issues:
- Eviction of tenant under Clause (d) of Section 22 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. - Validity of admission by counsel as binding on the party. - Consideration of counsel's statement as a compromise. Eviction under Clause (d) of Section 22: The case involved the eviction of a tenant by a registered society under Clause (d) of Section 22 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The appellant, a landlord, sought eviction on the grounds that the premises were required for furtherance of its activities. The respondent, the tenant, initially denied the landlord's status as an institution and the bonafide requirement of the premises. However, the respondent's counsel later admitted these facts before the court. The Addl. Rent Controller relied on this admission to allow the eviction application. Subsequent legal challenges by the respondent were unsuccessful until the High Court allowed the respondent's second appeal, leading to the current appeal before the Supreme Court. Validity of Admission by Counsel: The central argument revolved around the validity of the counsel's admission as binding on the respondent. The appellant contended that the counsel's statement constituted an admission by the party, thus justifying the eviction order. However, the Supreme Court disagreed, emphasizing that the Addl. Rent Controller's jurisdiction hinges on factual determinations regarding the appellant's status as an institution and the bonafide requirement of the premises. Without proper material supporting these determinations, the satisfaction of the Controller would be vitiated, rendering the eviction order without jurisdiction. The Court highlighted that while a party's admission is relevant, the counsel's statement across the Bar cannot be automatically accepted as an admission binding the respondent, especially in the absence of corroborating material. Consideration of Counsel's Statement as a Compromise: Another argument raised was whether the counsel's statement should be construed as a compromise, given the respondent was granted five years to vacate the premises. The Court rejected this contention, clarifying that a compromise necessitates mutual agreement between parties, which was lacking in this scenario. The statement by the counsel conceding eviction grounds and seeking time for vacation did not meet the criteria for a legal compromise. In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's order, as it found no reason to interfere. The decision underscored the importance of factual basis and proper jurisdiction in eviction cases, emphasizing the limitations of counsel statements and the necessity for genuine compromises in legal proceedings.
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