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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the opposite party No. 14 could review his earlier order dated 2-4-66 by invoking the powers under Section 151, C.P.C. 2. Whether the opposite party No. 14 could recall or ignore the order dated 2-4-66 treating the same to be a nullity. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: Issue 1: Whether the opposite party No. 14 could review his earlier order dated 2-4-66 by invoking the powers under Section 151, C.P.C. The judgment clarifies that the term "review" means a judicial re-examination of the case in certain specified and prescribed circumstances. The power of review is not inherent in a Court or Tribunal; it is a creature of the statute. Courts or Tribunals of limited jurisdiction created under special statutes, like the O.E.A. Collector, do not have inherent power to review their own decisions unless permitted by statute. Section 38-A of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, which came into force on 2-10-1973, authorizes the O.E.A. Collector to review his decision or order within one year from the date of the decision or order on the ground of clerical or arithmetical mistakes. The application for review in this case was filed on 23-7-74, and none of the grounds for review under Section 38-A existed. Therefore, the O.E.A. Collector could not review his order on grounds not falling within the ambit of Section 38-A, nor could he exercise the power of review after the expiry of the one-year period prescribed by Section 38-A. Issue 2: Whether the opposite party No. 14 could recall or ignore the order dated 2-4-66 treating the same to be a nullity. It is well established that if a decree or an order is apparently a nullity, it can be ignored. The judgment cites Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, where it was observed that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity and its invalidity can be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon. In this case, the contention was that the order dated 2-4-66 was a nullity as the Estate Abolition Collector lacked inherent jurisdiction to entertain an application under Sections 6 and 7 of the Act after the expiry of the period of limitation. The judgment explains that inherent lack of jurisdiction means a power or jurisdiction that does not at all exist or vest in a Court. If a Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, even if it decides wrong, it does not act beyond its jurisdiction. The O.E.A. Collector had jurisdiction to entertain and decide applications under Sections 6 and 7 of the Act in respect of the subject matter of the dispute. Therefore, the order of settlement was not a nullity, even if the application was barred by limitation. The decision on the question of limitation is taken only after the Court or Tribunal has embarked upon an enquiry, and if a decision is taken in a suit or proceeding barred by time, it is not a nullity but an illegality that can only be remedied by an appellate or revisional authority. The judgment also addresses the contention that the public notice of the claim was not given as required by the first proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 8-A of the Act. The Estate Abolition Collector observed that the manner of service of the notice was not mentioned in the order-sheet, but the records showed that the notice was duly issued and objections were filed. The onus was on the opposite parties to prove non-compliance with the provisions, and no evidence was adduced to show that there was no proclamation at the locality. The appellate authority did not record a finding that the provisions of Section 8-A (2), first proviso, were not duly complied with. Finally, the judgment addresses the contention that the petitioner deity was not an ex-intermediary in respect of Khata No. 431 and that the character of some plots of land was not such as could have been settled under Sections 6 and 7 of the Act. This contention was not raised in the application for review, and the Estate Abolition Collector did not take such a ground for granting review. The order of settlement dated 2-4-66 was not reversed by appeal or revision, and the Tribunal could not recall or ignore its own order. Conclusion: The writ application is allowed, and the orders in Annexures 1 and 2 are quashed. No order as to costs is made.
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