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Issues Involved:
1. Refusal to condone delay in presenting an appeal. 2. Application of "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 3. Judicial discretion in condonation of delay. 4. Impact of recent legal principles on condonation of delay. Detailed Analysis: 1. Refusal to Condon Delay in Presenting an Appeal: The appeal was directed against the decision of the District Judge, Shimla, who refused to condone the delay in presenting an appeal. The original suit was dismissed on April 30, 1975, and the appellants applied for certified copies of the judgment and decree on June 2, 1975, and October 30, 1975, respectively. The certified copies were delivered on July 22, 1975, and December 3, 1975. The appeal was presented on December 4, 1975, resulting in a delay of about six months. 2. Application of "Sufficient Cause" Under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963: The appellants, who were the original plaintiffs, made an application for condonation of delay supported by an affidavit. The first appellant was a widow of advanced age, and the second appellant was in a family way during the relevant period. They claimed they were unable to contact their counsel and learned about the dismissal of the suit only on June 2, 1975. The respondents did not contest these averments. The District Judge dismissed the application, finding the grounds "simply vague" and "insufficient to convince a prudent person." The judge noted the lack of allegations regarding the first appellant's physical inability to contact the counsel and found no material evidence of the second appellant's condition affecting her ability to contact the counsel. 3. Judicial Discretion in Condonation of Delay: The substantial question of law was whether the District Judge acted judicially and correctly applied the principles governing the exercise of discretion in condoning the delay. The approach to condonation of delay has evolved, with courts now adopting a broader perspective to ensure substantial justice. The Supreme Court has condoned delays ranging from two to six years, emphasizing that statutory provisions should not be treated as penal statutes to punish erring parties. 4. Impact of Recent Legal Principles on Condonation of Delay: The court referred to several precedents, including Sital Prasad Saxena v. Union of India and Ram Sumiran v. D.D.C., where delays were condoned to advance substantial justice. The principles established in these cases highlight that courts should exercise discretion with vigilance and sound judgment, considering factors such as the status and background of the parties, the history of the litigation, and the circumstances leading to the delay. In the present case, the learned District Judge's refusal to condone the delay was found to be an error of law. The appellants were ladies, one of whom was a widow of advanced age and the other in a family way. These facts were not contested by the respondents. The court noted that litigation on behalf of such ladies is usually attended to by a relative, and the absence of the appellants or their relative at the time of the judgment's pronouncement justified their plea for condonation of delay. The delay was partly attributable to the non-preparation of the decree sheet in time by the trial court. The court concluded that the delay did not disclose negligence or lack of bona fides on the appellants' part and that sufficient cause for condonation was made out. Conclusion: The appeal was allowed, and the application for condonation of delay was granted. The case was remanded to the District Court with a direction to register and dispose of the appeal expeditiously by September 30, 1985. No order as to costs was made, and the parties were directed to appear before the District Court on April 25, 1985.
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