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Issues Involved:
1. Quashing of the proceeding under Section 138 of the N.I. Act due to limitation. 2. Sufficiency of allegations against the directors of the company under Section 141 of the N.I. Act. Detailed Analysis: Issue 1: Quashing of the proceeding under Section 138 of the N.I. Act due to limitation The petitioners sought to quash the proceeding on the grounds that the case was barred by limitation. They argued that the complainant issued the first notice on 22-06-2001 upon receiving information from the bank about the cheque bounce. However, the complainant issued a second notice on 18-08-2001 to circumvent the limitation period, which is not permissible under the law. The complainant denied issuing the first notice, which became a matter of fact to be decided during the trial. The court considered the supplementary affidavit filed by the petitioners, which included the two notices. The opposite party's affidavit-in-reply provided an evasive denial of the first notice. The court, relying on the decision in Badat and Co., Bombay v. East India Trading Co., held that the first notice was indeed issued and the complainant suppressed this fact to save the limitation period. The court applied the principle from the decision in Sadanandan Bhadran v. Madhavan Sunil Kumar, which states that once a notice under Clause (b) of Section 138 is given, the right to issue another notice is forfeited. The period of one month for filing the complaint starts from the day immediately following the expiration of 15 days from the receipt of the first notice. The court concluded that the complaint filed on 07-09-2001 was beyond the limitation period, as it should have been filed within one month from the expiration of 15 days after the first notice dated 22-06-2001. Therefore, the complaint was hopelessly barred by limitation. Issue 2: Sufficiency of allegations against the directors of the company under Section 141 of the N.I. Act The petitioners argued that the complaint did not contain specific averments that the directors were responsible for the day-to-day management and affairs of the company, as required under Section 141 of the N.I. Act. They cited several decisions, including K.D.G. Nair v. Jindal Menthol India Ltd. and Smt. Katta Sujata v. Fertilizers & Chemicals Travancore Ltd., to support their contention that the complaint must clearly state that the directors were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company. The opposite party contended that the complaint's paragraphs 2 and 5 indicated that the directors were responsible for the company's day-to-day affairs. They relied on decisions like Mohan Kumar Mukherjee v. Ledo Tea Company Limited and Natesha Singh v. Klen and Marshalls of Manufactures and Exporters Pvt. Ltd., arguing that the complaint sufficiently indicated the directors' involvement in the management. The court, after considering the submissions and the cited decisions, concluded that the allegations in the complaint were not sufficient to proceed against the directors under Section 138/141 of the N.I. Act. The authoritative pronouncements in the decisions cited by the petitioners were found to be applicable, and the court held that the complaint did not make out a case against the directors. Conclusion: The court allowed the quashing of the proceeding under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, holding that the complaint was barred by limitation and the allegations against the directors were insufficient. Consequently, the proceeding being case No. 1070-C/2001 under Section 138 of the N.I. Act pending before the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Tamluk, Dist. Midnapore, was quashed.
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