9911796707
|
Home
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the relinquishment deed executed by the zamindar. 2. Entitlement of the eldest son to the advance compensation deposited by the Government. 3. Jurisdiction of the Court of Wards under Section 34 of the Court of Wards Act. 4. Application of the doctrine of renunciation and surrender under Hindu law. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Validity of the Relinquishment Deed: The core issue was whether the relinquishment deed executed by the zamindar in favor of his eldest and second sons was valid. The deed purported to relinquish the zamindari estate of Sivagiri, including properties described in the schedule, in consideration of various payments and allowances. The Tribunal and the Court of Wards had previously rejected the deed, declaring it void under Section 34 of the Court of Wards Act. The Court of Wards' decision was upheld by the Government on appeal. The Court held that the relinquishment deed was ineffective to vest any title in the eldest son, as it was void under Section 34 of the Court of Wards Act. The deed amounted to a transfer of the estate by the father to the son, which was prohibited. 2. Entitlement to Advance Compensation: The eldest son claimed entitlement to the advance compensation deposited by the Government with the Tribunal, arguing that he became the owner of the impartible estate by virtue of the relinquishment deed. The Tribunal rejected this claim, and the Court affirmed the Tribunal's decision. The Court reasoned that the eldest son did not have any title to the property at the time of the renunciation, except the chance of succeeding by survivorship after the father's death. Therefore, the relinquishment deed could not confer any title upon him. 3. Jurisdiction of the Court of Wards: The appellant argued that the notification by the Court of Wards was without jurisdiction, as the foundation for the exercise of jurisdiction under Sections 18 and 19 of the Court of Wards Act was a declaration under Section 17 that all the coparceners were previously declared disqualified under Section 9. The Court dismissed this argument, noting that it was not raised before the Tribunal and was too late to be raised now. Additionally, the argument assumed that all the sons of the zamindar were holding the impartible estate as coparceners, which the Court found to be without basis. 4. Application of Doctrine of Renunciation and Surrender: The appellant contended that the relinquishment deed was effective on the analogy of renunciation of the interest of a coparcener in favor of other coparceners in the case of partible joint family property and on the analogy of the surrender under Hindu law of the estate by a limited owner to the nearest reversioner. The Court rejected this contention, explaining that the doctrine of renunciation applicable to partible property does not apply to impartible estates. The junior members of a joint family in the case of an ancient impartible joint family estate have no present interest in the property itself, only the right to take the estate by survivorship after the death of the holder. Therefore, the relinquishment deed could not vest any title in the eldest son. The Court also rejected the application of the doctrine of surrender, noting that it is peculiar to the limited owner under Hindu law and does not apply to a full owner of property. The doctrine of surrender brings about a civil death or self-effacement of the limited owner, accelerating succession and letting in the next reversioner. This doctrine has no application to the case of a full owner of property, such as the holder of an impartible estate. Conclusion: The Court affirmed the Tribunal's decision that the eldest son did not become the owner of the impartible estate of Sivagiri and was not entitled to the advance compensation deposited by the Government. The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at Rs. 750.
|
