1999 (3) TMI 673 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to proceedings under Section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 (WBLRA).
2. Interpretation of the term "expressly excluded" in the context of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act.
3. Nature of applications under Section 8 of the WBLRA-whether they are akin to suits or not.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to Proceedings under Section 8 of the WBLRA:
The applicant's right of preemption under Section 8 of the WBLRA was rejected by the Munsiff on the grounds of being barred by limitation, with Section 5 of the Limitation Act deemed inapplicable. The conflict arose from two contrary decisions:
- Chandra Sekhar Sarkar v. Baidyanath Ghosh where Section 5 was held applicable.
- Minor Subir Ranjan Mandal v. Sitanath Mukherjee where it was held inapplicable.

Chatterjee J. in Minor Subir Ranjan Mandal distinguished Guha J.'s view in Chandra Sekhar Sarkar by referencing the Supreme Court's decision in Hukumdev Narayan Yadav v. Lalit Narayan Mishra, the scheme of the WBLRA, and Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. Chatterjee J. concluded that an application under Section 8 should be treated as a plaint in a suit and thus, Section 5 would not apply.

2. Interpretation of "Expressly Excluded" in Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act:
Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act implies that the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 apply to special or local laws unless expressly excluded. Despite the word "expressly," the judicial interpretation has included exclusion by necessary implication. Chatterjee J. held that the absence of reference to Section 5 in Section 8, while it was included in other sections of the WBLRA, implied its exclusion by necessary implication. This was supported by the legislative history and the consistent judicial interpretation that Section 5 did not apply to preemption proceedings under Section 8 before the amendment.

3. Nature of Applications under Section 8 of the WBLRA:
The court examined whether applications under Section 8 should be treated as suits. The definition of "suit" in the Limitation Act and judicial interpretations suggest that a suit is an independent proceeding initiated for the final determination of issues. Applications under Section 8 initiate original proceedings before the Munsiff, culminating in an order akin to a decree. The court noted that the terminology used in the WBLRA and the Limitation Act should not define the nature of proceedings but rather the substantive rights involved.

The court concluded that applications under Section 8 are original and independent proceedings, similar to suits. This interpretation aligns with the broader judicial understanding that suits can be initiated by various forms, not just by filing a plaint.

Conclusion:
The court upheld Chatterjee J.'s view that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to proceedings under Section 8 of the WBLRA. The decision in Chandra Sekhar Sarkar v. Baidyanath Ghosh was found to be incorrect in law. The judgment emphasized the legislative intent and the need to interpret the provisions of the WBLRA and the Limitation Act in a manner consistent with the statutory scheme and judicial precedents.

Order:
The view that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to proceedings under Section 8 of the WBLRA is affirmed.