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Issues Involved:
1. Legality of the approver's evidence. 2. Validity of the tender of pardon by the District Magistrate. 3. Sufficiency of corroboration of the approver's evidence. Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Legality of the Approver's Evidence: The appellant contended that Albert, being an accomplice or co-accused, had not been formally discharged before being tendered a pardon, making his evidence as an approver legally inadmissible. The judgment clarified that the moment the pardon was tendered, Albert must be presumed to have been discharged, thereby ceasing to be an accused and becoming a witness. The court dismissed the appellant's reliance on precedents, stating that those cases were distinguishable and not applicable under the provisions of Section 337 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The court concluded that there was no merit in the objection regarding the legality of the approver's evidence. 2. Validity of the Tender of Pardon by the District Magistrate: The appellant argued that since the commitment had already been made, only the court of the Sessions Judge, not the District Magistrate, could direct the tender of pardon. The court referred to Section 338 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which allows the court to which commitment is made to tender pardon or order the Committing Magistrate or the District Magistrate to tender pardon during the trial. However, the court emphasized that this does not negate the power conferred under the proviso to Section 337 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The proviso specifically empowers the District Magistrate to tender a pardon at any stage of the investigation, inquiry, or trial of the offence. The court held that the tender of pardon by the District Magistrate on August 28, 1952, was valid and noted that no objections to the validity of the pardon were raised in the lower courts. 3. Sufficiency of Corroboration of the Approver's Evidence: The appellant made a faint attempt to challenge the conviction on the merits, arguing that the confession was neither true nor voluntary and lacked sufficient corroboration by other evidence. The court declined to entertain this contention as it involved pure questions of fact. The court noted that the Sessions Judge and the High Court had found the approver's evidence to be sufficiently corroborated by other prosecution evidence. The court saw no reason to differ from these findings and found no flagrant error of law or procedure that would justify reconsideration. The court concluded that the conviction and sentence were fully justified. Conclusion: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the conviction and sentence of death of the appellant. The court found no merit in the contentions regarding the legality of the approver's evidence, the validity of the tender of pardon by the District Magistrate, and the sufficiency of corroboration of the approver's evidence. The judgment affirmed that the procedural and substantive requirements of the law were duly met, and no miscarriage of justice occurred.
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