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Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the Act under Article 31A. 2. Discrimination and deprivation of rights. 3. Payment of compensation. 4. Public purpose. 5. Rights of the petitioner under the Ijara deed. 6. Applicability of the Act to lands with Butta rights. Detailed Analysis: 1. Validity of the Act under Article 31A: The petitioner challenged the validity of Bombay Act LXV of 1959, which abolished the Aghat tenure and the Ijaras in the Saurashtra area. The court examined whether the Act fell within the protection of Article 31A of the Constitution. The Act was found to be limited in its operation to the Saurashtra area because Aghat tenure and Ijaras existed only there. The court held that the rights granted under the Ijara were rights in respect of land arising under the grant and constituted an "estate" within the meaning of Article 31A(2). Therefore, the petitioner was barred from contending that the statute was unconstitutional or violated Articles 14 and 31. 2. Discrimination and deprivation of rights: The petitioner argued that the Act was discriminatory as it affected only his rights and not those of other land occupants. The court found no merit in this argument, stating that the Act applied uniformly to all Ijaras and Aghat tenures in the Saurashtra area. The court also addressed the contention that the Act amounted to deprivation of property without public purpose. It held that the Act aimed to abolish intermediaries and establish direct relationships between the State and the tillers, which constituted a public purpose. 3. Payment of compensation: The petitioner contended that the Act did not provide adequate compensation. The court noted that the Act provided for compensation for the loss of rights under the Ijara. Section 9 of the Act provided for compensation payable to the Ijardar for public roads, lanes, paths, bridges, ditches, etc., lying in the Ijara lands. The court held that the compensation provided under the Act was not inadequate and that the adequacy of compensation could not be challenged under Article 31A. 4. Public purpose: The petitioner argued that the Act did not serve a public purpose as it benefited only a limited number of tenants. The court rejected this argument, stating that the Act aimed to abolish intermediaries and prevent the concentration of large landholdings, which was a public purpose. The court cited previous judgments, including the Supreme Court's decision in Thakur Amar Singnji v. State of Rajasthan, to support its conclusion that the abolition of intermediaries served a public purpose. 5. Rights of the petitioner under the Ijara deed: The petitioner claimed that he had acquired Butta rights in respect of 1300 acres of land and that these lands were no longer Ijara lands. The court found that there was no evidence to support this claim and that the petitioner had not established his purchase of Butta rights. The court also noted that the petitioner had not been conferred occupancy rights under the resolution dated March 1, 1950, and that the lands in question were still considered Ijara lands under the Act. 6. Applicability of the Act to lands with Butta rights: The petitioner argued that the Act could not apply to lands for which he had acquired Butta rights. The court held that the petitioner had not provided sufficient proof of acquiring Butta rights for the 1300 acres. The court also noted that Section 3 of the Act provided a special forum to decide whether an Ijardar had Butta rights in any Ijara land. Therefore, the court did not address this disputed question in the petition. Conclusion: The court dismissed the petition, holding that the Bombay Act LXV of 1959 was valid under Article 31A and served a public purpose by abolishing intermediaries between the State and the tillers. The court found no merit in the petitioner's claims of discrimination, deprivation of rights, and inadequate compensation. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs, with fees taxed at Rs. 350 due to the importance of the questions raised.
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