1991 (1) TMI 464 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the offence of criminal breach of trust punishable under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code is a continuing offence.
2. Whether the complaint regarding non-return of stridhan by the husband and other relations is barred by the limitation period prescribed under Section 468(2)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
3. Whether the complaint or summoning order of the trial court is vague due to lack of specific allegations.

Detailed Analysis:

Issue 1: Whether the offence of criminal breach of trust punishable under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code is a continuing offence.

The primary question for decision was whether the offence under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code constitutes a continuing offence. The court examined this issue in depth, referring to various precedents and legal principles. The judgment highlighted that the expression "continuing offence" is not defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Deokaran Kenshi explained that a continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from an offence committed once and for all. The court also referred to Bhagirath Kanoris v. State of M.P., where the Supreme Court provided illustrative cases to distinguish between continuing and non-continuing offences.

The court analyzed several cases, including Best v. Butler and Fitzgibbon, Verney v. Mark Fletcher & Sons Ltd., and The London County Council v. Worley, which dealt with continuing offences in different contexts. The court concluded that the offence of criminal breach of trust under Section 406 is a continuing offence, as the misappropriated property continues to be "stolen property" until it is restored to the rightful owner.

Issue 2: Whether the complaint regarding non-return of stridhan by the husband and other relations is barred by the limitation period prescribed under Section 468(2)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The Division Bench addressed the issue of whether the non-return of stridhan constitutes a continuing offence, thereby affecting the limitation period for filing a complaint. It was held that the offence is indeed a continuing one, and each day the stridhan is not returned constitutes a fresh cause of action. Consequently, the limitation period does not start from the day the wife was allegedly turned out of the house but continues until the stridhan is returned. Therefore, the contention that the complaint was filed after the expiry of the limitation period was found to be untenable.

Issue 3: Whether the complaint or summoning order of the trial court is vague due to lack of specific allegations.

Regarding the merits of the petition, the court examined whether the complaint was vague due to the lack of specific allegations. It was found that the complaint explicitly mentioned the entrustment of the stridhan and the refusal of the husband to return it despite repeated requests. The court emphasized that the absence of names of the respectables who made the requests is inconsequential because the principle that "it is the quality of evidence and not the quantity that counts" applies. Hence, the complaint was not considered vague.

Conclusion:

The court concluded that the offence under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code is a continuing offence. The non-return of stridhan by the husband and other relations continues to give a fresh cause of action until the stridhan is returned, and thus the complaint is not barred by the limitation period. Additionally, the complaint was found to be sufficiently specific and not vague. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, and the petitioner was directed to appear before the trial court.

Judgment Dated 21-3-1991 Passed By Hon'ble Single Judge:

The single judge reiterated the Division Bench's finding that the offence under Section 406 is a continuing offence. The contention that the complaint was filed after the limitation period was rejected, and the complaint's specificity was upheld. The petition was dismissed, and the petitioner was directed to appear before the trial court on 23-4-1991.