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Issues:
1. Whether the Magistrate could take cognizance of the offence under Section 500 I.P.C. after the expiry of the period of limitation as prescribed by Section 468 of the CrPC. Detailed Analysis: 1. The appellant filed a complaint against the respondent for the commission of an offence Under Section 406/420 I.P.C. on March 15, 1972. The complaint Under Section 500 I.P.C. was filed on February 11, 1976, alleging that the defamatory matter was contained in the earlier complaint. The period of limitation for the offence was three years, as per Section 468 of the CrPC. The High Court held that the cause of action for defamation could not arise before the respondent was acquitted, but the Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the date of the offence was March 15, 1972, and the Magistrate could not take cognizance after the limitation period had expired. 2. The High Court's reasoning that the protection of Section 468(c) was not available to the appellant because the cause of action could not arise before the respondent's acquittal was deemed erroneous by the Supreme Court. The Court clarified that the date of the offence was when the defamatory complaint was filed, not when the cause of action arose. Therefore, the High Court's interpretation was incorrect, and the Magistrate could not take cognizance after the limitation period had lapsed. 3. The respondent argued for the exclusion of time under Section 470 of the CrPC in computing the period of limitation. However, the Supreme Court found that the respondent did not meet the essential requirements of the subsection, as he was not prosecuting the appellant in any other proceeding related to the same facts. Therefore, the respondent was not entitled to the exclusion of time under Section 470. 4. The Supreme Court emphasized the legislative policy behind statutes of limitation, which aim to prevent belated and dormant claims, protect the accused from unnecessary harassment, and safeguard against the loss of evidence due to delays. The Court concluded that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of Section 468, which bars the taking of cognizance after the expiry of the limitation period. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and quashed the Magistrate's order taking cognizance of the offence against the appellant.
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