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2018 (8) TMI 2141 - SC - Indian LawsExaggeration of the issue - doctrine of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus (false in one thing, false in everything) - Setting out fire on the houses of IPF members, including the party leader - assault of IPF members and breaking into the houses of the locality and destroying household articles - stealing money - snatching a pair of gold earrings - HELD THAT - It is a well settled position of law that the testimony of a witness cannot be discarded in toto merely due to the presence of embellishments or exaggerations. The doctrine of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, which means false in one thing, false in everything has been held to be inapplicable in the Indian scenario, where the tendency to exaggerate is common. This Court has endorsed the inapplicability of the doctrine in several decisions, such as Nisar Ali v. State of Uttar Pradesh 1957 (2) TMI 92 - SUPREME COURT , Ugar Ahir v. State of Bihar 1964 (3) TMI 128 - SUPREME COURT , Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab, 2003 (7) TMI 704 - SUPREME COURT , Narain v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2004 (2) TMI 742 - SUPREME COURT and KAMESHWAR SINGH AND ORS. VERSUS STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. 2018 (4) TMI 1965 - SUPREME COURT . In Krishna Mochi v. State of Bihar, 2002 (4) TMI 971 - SUPREME COURT , this Court highlighted the dangers of applying the doctrine in the Indian scenario holding that The aforesaid dictum is not a sound Rule for the reason that one hardly comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries or embellishment. It is not uncommon for witnesses to make exaggerations during the course of evidence. But merely because there are certain exaggerations, improvements and embellishments, the entire prosecution story should not be doubted. It is found from the records that the versions of the eye witnesses cannot be said to be untrustworthy, especially in light of the observation of this Court in Masalti's case 1964 (5) TMI 45 - SUPREME COURT . There are as many as 24 injured eye witnesses in the case and their presence cannot be doubted. In this situation, it is found that the High Court has not applied its judicial mind in determining whether the judgment of the trial court was perverse inasmuch as the entire body of evidence was discarded, simply on the basis that some of the witnesses had deposed for the first time before the Court. The High Court has not at all assigned any cogent reason for reaching its conclusion. The revisional jurisdiction must be exercised by the High Court only in exceptional circumstances, where there is a gross miscarriage of justice, manifest illegality or perversity in the judgment of the lower court. Interference would be warranted only if there is a manifest illegality in the judgment of the lower court. But in the matter on hand, because of non-furnishing of valid reasons by the Trial Court, while coming to its conclusion, there is manifest illegality, and thus, the view taken by the High Court cannot be termed as reasonable - the revisional jurisdiction vested in the High Court has not been properly exercised by the High Court. The High Court should not have proceeded casually while affirming the judgment of the trial Court. Having regard to the material on record and having regard to the magnitude of the offence, the High Court should have been more serious while considering the revision petition. The High Court has failed to consider whether the Trial Court discarded material evidence in the form of eye-witness testimony on the issues of murder, attempt to murder and grievous hurt and completely overlooked evidence on other charges such as unlawful assembly and house-burning - the High Court has not given due consideration to the evidence on record to arrive at a reasoned conclusion and has thus failed to exercise its revisional jurisdiction in accordance with established principles. In our opinion, it would be appropriate for the High Court to undertake proper consideration of the material of the matter once again with due application of the judicial mind to find out as to whether the trial Court's order has caused gross miscarriage of justice, manifest illegality or perversity. Appeal allowed.
Issues Involved:
1. Scope of interference by the Supreme Court with a High Court judgment affirming an acquittal. 2. Evaluation of eyewitness testimonies and their consistency. 3. Consideration of material evidence related to charges other than murder. 4. Conflict between ocular testimony and medical evidence. 5. Application of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Scope of Interference by the Supreme Court: The Supreme Court addressed the preliminary question regarding its power to interfere with a High Court judgment affirming an acquittal. It was clarified that the restriction under Section 401(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not limit the Supreme Court's jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. The Court cited "Dharma v. Nirmal Singh" and "State of Rajasthan v. Islam" to affirm that it could review the entire material to ensure justice if the High Court's view was unreasonable. 2. Evaluation of Eyewitness Testimonies: The trial court had observed that several eyewitnesses revealed material facts for the first time during the trial, which were not mentioned during the police investigation, leading to their acquittal. The Supreme Court, however, revisited the testimonies of PWs 5, 7, and 14 and found no significant variations in their accounts. The Court emphasized that minor inconsistencies are natural and do not necessarily discredit the entire testimony. The principle that a few consistent eyewitness accounts can sustain a conviction in cases involving many offenders and victims was reiterated, citing "Masalti v. State of U.P." 3. Consideration of Material Evidence Related to Charges Other Than Murder: The High Court and trial court had overlooked evidence concerning charges other than murder, such as house burning and unlawful assembly. The Supreme Court noted that the trial court dismissed the evidence related to house burning due to non-production of burnt articles, despite the seizure list (Ex. 1) indicating otherwise. The Court emphasized that evidence on unlawful assembly and common object could be inferred from the available material, and separate evidence for these aspects was unnecessary. 4. Conflict Between Ocular Testimony and Medical Evidence: The Supreme Court observed that the High Court ignored the fact that both lathis and sharp-edged weapons were used in the assault. It reiterated that ocular testimony should prevail over medical evidence if found trustworthy and credible, citing "State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal." The Court found that the High Court failed to consider whether the trial court's judgment was perverse due to overlooking material evidence. 5. Application of Revisional Jurisdiction by the High Court: The Supreme Court criticized the High Court for not applying its judicial mind to determine whether the trial court's judgment was perverse. It noted that the High Court did not consider evidence related to charges other than murder and failed to provide cogent reasons for its conclusion. The Court emphasized that revisional jurisdiction should be exercised only in exceptional circumstances where there is a gross miscarriage of justice, manifest illegality, or perversity in the lower court's judgment, citing "Sheetala Prasad v. Shree Kant." Conclusion: The Supreme Court found that the High Court failed to exercise its revisional jurisdiction properly and overlooked material evidence. It set aside the High Court's judgment and remitted the matter for reconsideration on merits, emphasizing that the observations made should not influence the High Court's decision. The appeal was allowed, and the case was remitted to the High Court to decide the revision petition in accordance with the law.
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