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Issues:
Delay in making an application for special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal under Section 417(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code and the condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Analysis: 1. The primary issue in this case revolves around whether the delay in making an application under Section 417(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code can be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The interpretation of whether Sub-section (4) of Section 417 is a special law is crucial in determining the applicability of Section 5 for condonation of delay. The Court delves into the definition of a "special law" as one that applies to a particular subject or class of subjects, emphasizing that the provision in question applies only to applications for special leave to appeal from orders of acquittal, making it a special law within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. 2. The argument presented challenges the applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, contending that the period prescribed by Sub-section (4) of Section 417 is not different from that laid down in the first schedule to the Limitation Act. The Court references previous judgments to support the view that the special law in question does prescribe a period of limitation different from the general provisions of the Limitation Act, thereby justifying the application of Section 29(2) in this scenario. 3. Another aspect of contention raised is whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act is relevant in determining the period of limitation prescribed by a special law. The Court clarifies that Section 5 comes into play after the period of limitation has expired, focusing on condoning delay rather than computing the period of limitation. The interpretation of the phrase "for the purpose of determining any period of limitation" is crucial in understanding the scope of Section 5 in relation to special laws like Sub-section (4) of Section 417. 4. The Court further addresses the argument that Section 29(2) only applies to provisions related to the computation of the period of limitation. It emphasizes that every provision in the Limitation Act is intended for determining the period of limitation, including Section 5 for condoning delay. The comprehensive analysis provided by the Court highlights the interplay between different sections of the Limitation Act and their relevance in cases involving special laws like Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 5. Lastly, the Court considers and contrasts the decisions of various High Courts on similar issues, ultimately disagreeing with the interpretations of the Madras and Andhra Pradesh High Courts. The Court concludes that the provision in question is a special law with a distinct period of limitation, warranting the negative answer to the question referred to the Full Bench. In conclusion, the judgment extensively analyzes the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in cases involving special laws like Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code, ultimately clarifying the conditions under which delay in making applications for special leave to appeal from orders of acquittal can be condoned.
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