2023 (1) TMI 1362 - HC - Indian Laws

Challenge to order against acquittal passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate - presumption of innocence - benefit of doubt - The case's origin traced back to a marriage in 2001, followed by allegations of dowry harassment and cruelty, leading to various legal proceedings, including FIR registration, charge framing, and acquittals at different judicial level - HELD THAT - It is well settled that in an appeal against acquittal, the scope of the learned Appellate Court is to the extent that the judgment of acquittal should not be ordinarily interfered with unless the findings in such judgment are shown to be arrived at by incorrect or perverse appreciation of material on record and the law. This settled position of law with respect to the scope of the learned Appellate Court qua an appeal against the acquittal has been considered in a catena of judgments by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In Basheera Begam v. Mohd. Ibrahim, 2020 (1) TMI 1681 - SUPREME COURT the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held When there is circumstantial evidence pointing to the guilt of the accused, it is necessary to prove a motive for the crime. However, motive need not be proved where there is direct evidence. In this case, there is no direct evidence of the crime. The petitioner had challenged the order of acquittal passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate before the learned Sessions Court, and the latter, after examining the records of the case found no anomaly in the impugned judgment and agreed with the view taken by the learned trial Court. In these circumstances, the presumption of innocence qua the respondent has been reinforced twice over. This Court finds that the learned trial Court as well as the learned Appellate Court has carefully scrutinized the evidence on record and has dealt with each and every issue raised by the petitioner/complainant. The views taken by both the courts below are possible. From the evidence, it is clear that not only the allegation of demand of dowry qua the respondent were vague but the discrepancy in the allegations of harassment and cruelty were substantial to give benefit of doubt to the respondent and acquitting him. There is no ground made out to interfere with the judgment passed by learned Metropolitan Magistrate and the judgment of the learned Appellate Court dated 21.02.2018, upholding the acquittal of the respondent by the learned trial Court - Petition dismissed.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Acquittal of the accused under Section 498A of the IPC.
2. Discharge of the Mother-in-law and Sister-in-law under Section 498A and 406 of the IPC.
3. Discharge of the accused under Section 406 of the IPC.
4. Scope of appeal against acquittal.
5. Reappreciation of evidence by higher courts.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Acquittal of the accused under Section 498A of the IPC:
The petitioner challenged the acquittal of the accused, asserting that there were specific instances of cruelty and dowry harassment. The trial court had ignored evidence, including a letter written by the petitioner to her father and testimony regarding an injury caused by the accused. However, the appellate court upheld the trial court's judgment, finding no anomaly in the acquittal. The presumption of innocence was reinforced twice over due to the concurrent findings of the trial and appellate courts.

2. Discharge of the Mother-in-law and Sister-in-law under Section 498A and 406 of the IPC:
The petitioner sought to set aside the discharge of the Mother-in-law and Sister-in-law under Sections 498A and 406 of the IPC. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate had discharged them, and this order was upheld by the Additional Sessions Judge. The petitioner's revision petition against this discharge was dismissed, and the petitioner challenged this dismissal before the High Court, which also did not find grounds to interfere with the lower courts' findings.

3. Discharge of the accused under Section 406 of the IPC:
The accused was also discharged under Section 406 of the IPC by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate. The petitioner challenged this discharge, but the Additional Sessions Judge dismissed the revision petition. The High Court, in its judgment, did not find any perversity in the lower courts' findings to warrant interference.

4. Scope of appeal against acquittal:
The judgment emphasized the limited scope of an appellate court in interfering with an acquittal. The appellate court should not ordinarily interfere unless the findings are shown to be arrived at by incorrect or perverse appreciation of material on record and the law. The Supreme Court in various precedents has reiterated that the burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt lies on the prosecution, and if two views are possible, the one favoring the accused must be preferred.

5. Reappreciation of evidence by higher courts:
The judgment highlighted that reappreciation of evidence by higher courts in criminal revision is limited. The Supreme Court has held that if the courts below have recorded findings of fact, reappreciation of evidence by a third court does not arise unless the findings are totally perverse. The High Court in this case found that both the trial and appellate courts had carefully scrutinized the evidence, and the views taken were possible. The discrepancies in the allegations were substantial enough to give the benefit of doubt to the respondent.

Conclusion:
The High Court dismissed the present petition, finding no grounds to interfere with the judgments of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate and the appellate court. The concurrent findings of acquittal were upheld, and the presumption of innocence was reinforced. The petition was disposed of accordingly, along with any pending applications.