2023 (11) TMI 1257 - AT - Income Tax

Revision u/s 263 - allowability of CSR expenditure u/s. 80G - HELD THAT - Explanation 2 to section 37(1) of the Act says that any expenditure relatable to the discharge of CSR is not business expenditure and cannot be allowed as such. On this aspect, there is no contradiction of the fact submitted by the assessee that in compliance with this requirement, the assessee does not claim any deduction of such amount spent as CSR under any of the provisions between sections 30 and 36 of the Act, and suo moto disallowed the same by adding it back to the profit and loss account. It is only thereafter the business income of the assessee is computed in accordance with the principles laid down for computation of the profits and gains of business or profession in sections 28 to 44DB of the Act. By this, the assessee seeks compliance with Explanation 2 of section 37 of the Act and, therefore, the revenue shall not have any grievance. Whether or not the assessee suo moto disallowed the amount spend towards the CSR while computing the business income is a verifiable fact. After computing the business income, while computing the total income of the assessee, the assessee is invoking the benefit under Chapter VIA by claiming deduction of the sums u/s 80G of the Act. According to the revenue, when once such sum went to satisfy the requirement of section 135 of the Companies Act, the benefit gets exhausted and such an amount is no more available for the purpose of claiming deduction under section 80G of the Act. There is no express provision to support the contention of Revenue. On the other hand, section 80G (2) (iiihk) and (iiihl) of the Act expressly provide that such sums donated for Swatch Bharath Kosh and Clean Ganga Fund shall be the amounts other than the sums spent by the assessee in pursuance of CSR, meaning thereby the donations made towards Swatch Bharath Kosh and Clean Ganga Fund spent as a part of CSR are not qualified for deduction under section 80G of the Act. Out of so many entries under section 80G(2) of the Act, only donations in respect of two entries are restricted if such payments were towards the discharge of the CSR. The Legislature could have put a similar embargo in respect of the other entries also, but such a restriction is conspicuously absent for other entries. The irresistible conclusion that would flow from it is that it is not the legislative intention to bar the payments covered by section 80G(2) of the Act which were made pursuant to the CSR, and other than covered by section 80G(2)(iiihk) and (iiihl) of the Act. As stated above, clue can be had from the restrictions by way of section 80G (2) (iiihk) and (iiihl) of the Act. Explanation 2 to section 37(1) of the Act which denies deduction for CSR expenses by way of business expenditure is applicable only to extent of computing 'business income' under Chapter IV-D of the Act and; it could not be extended or imported to CSR contributions which was otherwise eligible for deduction under Chapter VI-A of the Act. Where the deduction under section 80G of the Act is also disallowed, since CSR qualifying donations are not 'voluntary contributions', it will be a double jeopardy in the case of assessee. Assessee cannot be denied the benefit of claim under Chapter VIA of the Act, which is considered for computing 'Total Taxable Income . If assessee is denied this benefit, merely because such payment forms part of CSR, it would lead to double disallowance, which is not the intention of Legislature at all. Legislature on this matter simply dealing with the computation of total income under chapter IVD pertaining to Income under the head Business and Profession and not at all dealt with the eligibility of assessee to claim deduction u/s. 80G of the Act, falling in chapter VIA of the Act. It is further observed that genuineness of the transactions and identity of the donees are also not under challenge. All the payments were made through proper banking channel and appropriate donation receipts were also produced before the lower authorities and before us also. Thus there is no bar for the assessee to claim benefit u/s. 80G of the Act, falling in Chapter VIA of the Act, we found observations of the Ld. PCIT as untenable in law, in the result grounds raised by the assessee are allowed and order of Ld. PCIT passed u/s. 263 of the Act is setaside. Appeal of the assessee is allowed.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Validity of order passed under section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961
2. Non-granting of deduction under section 80G of the Act
3. Other Issues

Summary:
The appeal was filed against the order of the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai-4 under section 263 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 for the assessment year 2018-19. The appellant challenged the order on the grounds of legality and validity. The appellant specifically contested the disallowance of deduction under section 80G of the Act related to CSR expenses amounting to INR 1,88,69,677. The appellant argued that the assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue's interest without proper inquiries. The appellant sought to quash the impugned order as being bad in law.

The Principal Commissioner relied on clause (a) to Explanation 2 of section 263(1) of the Act and various decisions including the case of Malabar Industrial Co. Limited v. CIT. The appellant contended that the Principal Commissioner erred in exercising revision powers without demonstrating how the claims regarding deduction under section 80G of the Act were not maintainable. Additionally, the appellant argued that the Principal Commissioner failed to follow binding decisions of higher appellate authorities.

The case involved the assessment of the appellant's income, with a focus on deductions under Chapter VI-A. The Principal Commissioner issued a notice under section 263 to examine the allowability of CSR expenditure under section 80G. The Principal Commissioner set aside the assessment order, directing the AO to disallow the claim of the appellant under section 80G. The appellant challenged this decision, leading to the present appeal.

Upon review, the Appellate Tribunal found that the appellant had complied with the requirements regarding CSR expenditure and disallowed the amount while computing business income. The Tribunal also noted that there was no legislative intention to bar payments covered by section 80G made as part of CSR. The Tribunal concluded that the Principal Commissioner's observations were untenable in law, allowing the grounds raised by the appellant and setting aside the order passed under section 263 of the Act.

In conclusion, the appeal of the appellant was allowed, and the order was set aside.