2022 (1) TMI 1433 - SC - Indian Laws

Civil suit - limited jurisdiction exercised by High Court - It is the appellant s case that due to the detention, the appellant was prevented from effectively contesting and participating in the civil suit - Whether the High Court was justified and correct in law and on facts in exercising powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to set aside the order allowing the application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 filed by Shailendra Garg, sole proprietor of M/s Garment Craft? HELD THAT - The impugned order is contrary to law and cannot be sustained for several reasons, but primarily for deviation from the limited jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal. The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. The power under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, like when there is no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so perverse that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion that the court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice. The factum that the counsel for the appellant had applied for the certified copy would show that the counsel for the appellant was aware that the ex-parte decree had been passed on the account of failure to lead defence evidence. This would not, however, be a good ground and reason to set aside and substitute the opinion formed by the trial court that the appellant being incarcerated was unable to lead evidence and another chance should be given to the appellant to lead defence evidence. The discretion exercised by the trial court in granting relief, did not suffer from an error apparent on the face of the record or was not a finding so perverse that it was unsupported by evidence to justify it. The impugned order dated 4th July 2019 is set aside - the order dated 24th July 2018 passed by the Additional District Judge, (Central), Tis Hazari, Delhi, is restored allowing the application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code and setting aside ex-parte decree and the judgment dated 8th November 2016 - Appeal allowed.

Summary

Issues Involved:

1. Justification of High Court's exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
2. Validity of the ex-parte decree and the subsequent setting aside of the decree under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
3. Adequacy of opportunities provided to the appellant to lead defence evidence.
4. Procedural fairness in the issuance of production warrants for the appellant.
5. Impact of the appellant's incarceration on his ability to participate in the civil suit proceedings.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Justification of High Court's exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India:
The Supreme Court held that the High Court's exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 was inappropriate. The High Court is not to act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate or reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is to correct grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. The High Court should not substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion for that of the inferior court or tribunal unless the finding is so perverse that no reasonable person could come to such a conclusion.

2. Validity of the ex-parte decree and the subsequent setting aside of the decree under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:
The Supreme Court restored the trial court's order dated 24th July 2018, which had set aside the ex-parte decree. The trial court had found sufficient cause for non-appearance of the appellant due to his incarceration and allowed the application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code, setting aside the ex-parte decree and restoring the suit for defence evidence. The Supreme Court noted that the trial court's decision did not suffer from an error apparent on the face of the record or was not a finding so perverse that it was unsupported by evidence.

3. Adequacy of opportunities provided to the appellant to lead defence evidence:
The Supreme Court observed that the appellant was unable to lead defence evidence due to his incarceration from 6th October 2015 to 6th May 2017. The trial court had issued production warrants for the appellant's appearance, but he was not produced by the Jail Superintendent. The trial court's decision to set aside the ex-parte decree and allow the appellant to lead defence evidence was justified as the appellant's non-appearance was beyond his control.

4. Procedural fairness in the issuance of production warrants for the appellant:
The Supreme Court emphasized that the issuance of production warrants depends on the facts of each case and whether the party can adduce evidence to prove its case. In this case, the appellant, being a sole proprietor, needed to appear for cross-examination, and the production warrant was issued for recording his testimony. The trial court's decision to issue production warrants was appropriate to ensure a fair opportunity for the appellant to establish his case.

5. Impact of the appellant's incarceration on his ability to participate in the civil suit proceedings:
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the appellant's incarceration significantly impacted his ability to participate in the civil suit proceedings. The appellant's counsel had informed the court about the appellant's detention, and the trial court had issued production warrants accordingly. The appellant's inability to communicate effectively with his counsel and follow up on the proceedings due to his incarceration was a valid ground for setting aside the ex-parte decree.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order dated 4th July 2019 and restored the trial court's order dated 24th July 2018, allowing the application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code and setting aside the ex-parte decree. The Supreme Court directed the parties to appear before the trial court on 2nd February 2022 for further proceedings and to ensure a fair opportunity for the appellant to lead defence evidence. The appeal was allowed with no order as to costs.