2018 (2) TMI 1450 - HC - Indian Laws

Whether the provisions of Limitation Act, especially Section 18 of the Act, which is invoked by the Trial Court, in this case, can be made applicable to the litigation which is governed by the provisions of the Carriage by Air Act, 1972? Held that - In the instant case, it is admitted that the Carriage by Air Act is a special enactment of the year 1972 and therefore later enactment to the general law of Limitation Act, which was enacted in 1963. Hence, as per above said Principle No.2, it will be necessary to ascertain the intention of the rule making authority to know which law should prevail. For this purpose, if one goes through the provisions of the said Act and the object and reasons for which the said Act was enacted, then it can be seen that the object of enacting the Carriage by Air Act 1972, was to provide a specific period of limitation and thereby to exclude the application of the Limitation Act. A cursory glance to the provisions of the Carriage by Air Act and the reading of the preamble of the Act makes it clear that it was enacted to give effect to the Warsaw Convention (of 1929) for unification of rules relating to international carriage by air to which India is a signatory, and further to give effect to the Hague Protocol of 1955. The rule making authority has made its intention clear that in case of the claims under this Act, the provisions of this Act will prevail in respect of limitation and thereby excluded the application of the general law of limitation. Consistent view taken by the Apex Court and also by various High Courts is that the Carriage by Air Act 1972, being a special statute, enacted to give effect to the international convention, the provisions thereof will have overriding effect. In view thereof, section 18 of the Limitation Act, which is a general enactment cannot have any application in the present case to extend the period of limitation, which is prescribed in Rule 30 of of Schedule II of the Act. As admittedly in this case, action of filing the suit in the Court was not taken within two years from the date on which cause of action arose and as provisions of Section 18 of the Limitation Act, cannot be made applicable, the suit apparently is barred by limitation - petition allowed - decided in favor of petitioner.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the suit is barred by limitation under Section 30 of the Carriage by Air Act, 1972.
2. Applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963, particularly Section 18, to the Carriage by Air Act, 1972.
3. Interpretation of "action" within the context of the Carriage by Air Act and the Airway Bill.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Whether the suit is barred by limitation under Section 30 of the Carriage by Air Act, 1972:
The primary issue was whether the suit filed by the respondent was barred by the limitation period prescribed under Section 30 of the Carriage by Air Act, 1972. The respondent sent perishable cargo on two occasions, both of which were damaged or destroyed. The respondent filed the suit on 15th September 2012, seeking damages. The trial court held that the suit was not barred by limitation, citing an alleged acknowledgment of liability by the petitioner. However, the High Court noted that the Carriage by Air Act, 1972, a special and later enactment, prescribes a specific limitation period of two years for filing claims, which overrides the general provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963. The High Court concluded that the suit, filed after the two-year period, was barred by limitation.

2. Applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963, particularly Section 18, to the Carriage by Air Act, 1972:
The trial court had invoked Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which allows for the extension of the limitation period based on acknowledgment of liability. The High Court, however, emphasized that the Carriage by Air Act, 1972, being a special statute, excludes the application of the general Limitation Act. The High Court cited various judgments, including those from the Supreme Court and other High Courts, to support the principle that special enactments with specific limitation periods prevail over general laws. Therefore, Section 18 of the Limitation Act could not be applied to extend the limitation period under the Carriage by Air Act.

3. Interpretation of "action" within the context of the Carriage by Air Act and the Airway Bill:
The High Court examined the term "action" as used in the Airway Bill and the Carriage by Air Act. The respondent argued that the term "action" referred to the lodging of the claim, which was done within the prescribed period. However, the High Court clarified that "action" in this context refers to the filing of a suit or legal action in court. The court noted that the Airway Bill's conditions, particularly Condition No. 10.4, align with Rule 30(1) of the Carriage by Air Act, which mandates that any right to damages shall be extinguished unless an action is brought within two years from the date of arrival or expected arrival of the cargo. Since the suit was not filed within this period, it was barred by limitation.

Conclusion:
The High Court set aside the trial court's order and held that the suit was barred by limitation. The court emphasized that the Carriage by Air Act, 1972, being a special statute with a specific limitation period, prevails over the general provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963. The acknowledgment of liability by the petitioner did not extend the limitation period under Section 18 of the Limitation Act. Consequently, the suit was dismissed for being filed beyond the prescribed two-year period.