9911796707
|
Home
Issues: Validity of disbarment under s. 288(4) of the Income Tax Act, 1961; Retrospective operation of s. 288(4) in disqualifying a practitioner.
Analysis: The judgment in question dealt with the issue of whether the provisions of s. 288(4) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which empower the Commissioner of Income-tax to disqualify a practitioner, are retrospective in operation. The case involved the respondent, an advocate, who had filed his income tax return for the assessment year 1958-59 and was subsequently found to have concealed his income, leading to a penalty being imposed on him. The Additional Income-tax Commissioner then disqualified the respondent from representing an assessee before the tax authorities for two years under s. 288(4) of the Act. The respondent challenged this disbarment through a writ petition, which was initially set aside by a learned single judge (V. S. Malhotra v. Union of India). The central issue revolved around whether the disbarment under s. 288(4) was validly exercised in the case of the respondent. The court analyzed the retrospective nature of s. 288(4) in light of the respondent's case, which involved an assessment under the Income Tax Act of 1922 but was completed after the enactment of the Income Tax Act of 1961. The court highlighted that s. 297(2)(g) of the Act allowed for penalties to be imposed under the new Act for defaults under the old Act. It was observed that s. 288(4) empowered the Commissioner to disbar a practitioner prospectively, and the penalty for the respondent's default could only be pecuniary under the old Act. The court emphasized that retroactive disbarment would constitute an ex post facto law, rendering it invalid and unjust. The Act of 1961 introduced a wider scope for penalties, including disbarment, for professional misconduct, but applying it retroactively would be against principles of justice. The judgment delved into the general disfavor towards retroactive legislation, citing constitutional provisions and legal principles that support prospective application of laws. The court underscored that legislation is primarily aimed at establishing rules for the future, not the past, and any new disability or disqualification should not apply retrospectively unless explicitly intended by the legislature. The court concluded that the power to disbar a practitioner should only be exercised for acts committed after the enactment of the Act of 1961 and that the respondent's disbarment was an ex post facto punishment, hence unsustainable in law. The decision of the learned judge was affirmed, and the appeal was dismissed, with each party bearing their own costs.
|
