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2019 (1) TMI 1023 - SC - Indian LawsDivestment of Director, CBI of all his functions - prior consent of the Committee not obtained before passing such order of divestment - Competence of the CVC and the Government of India to divest the Director, CBI of all his powers, functions, duties, supervisory role, etc. - Committee constituted under Section 4A(1) of the DSPE Act to make recommendations for appointment of the Director, CBI - Held that - There is no manner of doubt that the enactment of the CVC Act, 2003 and the amendments made by the said enactment, inter alia, in the DSPE Act (by Section 26 of the CVC Act, 2003) are a sequel to the operative directions of this Court in paragraph 58 of Vineet Narain 1997 (12) TMI 615 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA . The legislature in its wisdom had not considered the necessity of tempering down the directions of this Court in Vineet Narain in any manner whatsoever. The mode and manner of appointment of Central Vigilance Commissioner and Vigilance Commissioners as well as that of the Director, CBI as spelt out by this Court in Vineet Narain has been scrupulously followed by Parliament. In fact, at this stage, we may even take note of the fact that Parliament on its own in amending Section 4A of the DSPE Act by the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 (Act No.1 of 2014) has gone a step further to give effect to the directions of this Court made in Vineet Narain inasmuch as the object for change of the Committee for making recommendations for appointment of the Director, CBI has been stated to be the necessity to provide a High Power Selection Committee for selection of Director of the Delhi Special Police Establishment - The Court, in its bid to understand the true legislative intention behind the statutory enactments in question, cannot be oblivious of the views expressed by this Court in Vineet Narain leading to the operative directions in para 58 that formed the basis of the legislative exercise in question. If the legislative intent would have been to confer in any authority of the State a power to take interim measures against the Director, CBI thereby affecting his functioning, surely, the legislation would have contained enabling provisions to that effect and consequently would have been differently worded and drafted. It is against this backdrop that the words transferred except with the previous consent of the Committee mentioned in Section 4B(2) of the DSPE Act has to be understood. If the word transferred has to be understood in its ordinary parlance and limited to a change from one post to another, as the word would normally convey and on that basis the requirement of previous consent of the Committee is understood to be only in such cases, i.e. purely of transfer, such an interpretation would be selfdefeating and would clearly negate the legislative intent. In such an event it will be free for the State Authority to effectively disengage the Director, CBI from functioning by adopting various modes, known and unknown, which may not amount to transfer but would still have the same effect as a transfer from one post to another, namely, cessation of exercise of powers and functions of the earlier post. This is clearly not what the legislature could have intended. Application of Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 - power of Central Government to pass the impugned orders including the order of appointment of an acting Director of the CBI - Held that - The preceding discussions and our views on the true and correct meaning of the provisions contained in Sections 4A & 4B of the DSPE Act leaves us convinced that the aforesaid provisions of the General Clauses Act will have no application to the present case in view of the clear and apparent intention to the contrary that unequivocally flows from the aforesaid provisions of the DSPE Act. The CVC divesting the powers, functions, duties, supervisory role, etc. of Shri Alok Kumar Verma as Director, CBI is set aside - however, the issue of divestment of power and authority of the Director, CBI is still open for consideration by the Committee.
Issues Involved:
1. Legality and validity of the orders divesting the CBI Director of his powers. 2. Competence of the CVC and Government of India to divest the CBI Director without prior consent of the Committee under Section 4A(1) of the DSPE Act. 3. Interpretation of the term "transfer" under Section 4B(2) of the DSPE Act. 4. Application of Sections 14, 15, and 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. 5. Adequacy and relevance of reasons for the impugned decisions. Detailed Analysis: 1. Legality and Validity of the Orders Divesting the CBI Director of His Powers: The Supreme Court examined the orders dated 23rd October 2018, passed by the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) and the Government of India, which divested the CBI Director of his powers, functions, duties, and supervisory role. These orders were challenged in writ petitions filed by the CBI Director and a registered society. The Court noted that the orders were issued as interim measures pending an inquiry into allegations of corruption against the CBI Director. 2. Competence of the CVC and Government of India to Divest the CBI Director Without Prior Consent of the Committee Under Section 4A(1) of the DSPE Act: The Court emphasized that the legislative intent behind Sections 4A and 4B of the DSPE Act was to ensure the complete insulation of the CBI Director from extraneous influences. The Court held that any action affecting the CBI Director's functioning must have the prior consent of the Committee constituted under Section 4A(1) of the DSPE Act. The Court found that the impugned orders were issued without obtaining such consent, rendering them nonest in law. 3. Interpretation of the Term "Transfer" Under Section 4B(2) of the DSPE Act: The Court interpreted the term "transfer" in Section 4B(2) of the DSPE Act broadly to include any attempt to divest the CBI Director of his powers, functions, duties, etc., in any manner. The Court reasoned that a narrow interpretation, limited to a change from one post to another, would negate the legislative intent of insulating the CBI Director from extraneous influences. 4. Application of Sections 14, 15, and 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897: The Court rejected the argument that Sections 14, 15, and 16 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, conferred a power in the Central Government to pass the impugned orders. The Court held that the specific provisions of the DSPE Act, as amended, took precedence over the General Clauses Act, and the legislative intent was to ensure the independence of the CBI Director. 5. Adequacy and Relevance of Reasons for the Impugned Decisions: The Court noted that not much argument was made on the relevance or sufficiency of the grounds for the impugned decisions. The Court's decision to set aside the orders was based on the jurisdictional issue of prior consent, rendering the examination of the reasons for the decisions unnecessary. Conclusion: The Supreme Court set aside the orders dated 23rd October 2018, divesting the CBI Director of his powers, functions, duties, and supervisory role. The Court directed that the matter be considered by the Committee under Section 4A(1) of the DSPE Act within a week. The CBI Director, upon reinstatement, was directed to cease taking any major policy decisions until the Committee's decision. The Court disposed of the writ petitions and interlocutory applications, leaving the parties with the remedy of challenging consequential orders in an appropriate manner.
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