1973 (12) TMI 23 - HC - Income Tax

Application For Extension, Delay In Filing Return, Income Tax Act, Penal Interest, Registered Firm, The Constitution

Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction for charging penal interest under Section 139(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
2. Alleged hostile discrimination under Article 14 of the Constitution.
3. Validity of penal interest as compensation versus penalty for registered firms.

Detailed Analysis:

Jurisdiction for Charging Penal Interest:
The petitioners contended that the Income-tax Officer lacked jurisdiction to charge penal interest under Section 139(1) of the Act because the conditions precedent for invoking this section were not satisfied. Specifically, the petitioners argued that Section 139(4) is merely a proviso to Section 139(1), and since the return was filed before the completion of the assessment and within the permissible period, penal interest under Section 139(1) could not be charged.

The court examined the provisions of Section 139 as they stood at the relevant time. It clarified that Section 139(4) contemplates a different situation from the proviso to Section 139(1). The court held that if an assessee files a return before the assessment is made but after the time allowed under Section 139(1) or (2), the provisions of clause (iii) of the proviso to Section 139(1) apply, necessitating the charging of interest.

The court disagreed with the Andhra Pradesh High Court's interpretation in Kishanlal Haricharan v. Income-tax Officer, which suggested that penal interest could only be charged if an application for extension of time was made. The court supported its stance by referencing decisions from the Mysore and Gauhati High Courts, which held that penal interest is applicable even if no extension application is made, provided the return is filed within the period specified in Section 139(4).

Alleged Hostile Discrimination under Article 14:
The petitioners argued that the provisions for levying penal interest discriminated against assessees filing belated returns compared to those filing no returns at all, thereby violating Article 14 of the Constitution.

The court noted that while Article 14 forbids class legislation, it allows reasonable classification for legislative purposes. The court cited various Supreme Court decisions to illustrate that a person challenging a taxation statute on the grounds of discrimination must conclusively prove that persons equally circumstanced have been treated unequally.

The court found that the provisions regarding penal interest were a supplementary measure to enforce tax collection and did not constitute hostile discrimination. The distinction between late filers and non-filers was deemed reasonable and rationally related to the objective of timely tax collection.

Validity of Penal Interest as Compensation versus Penalty for Registered Firms:
The petitioners contended that treating a registered firm as an unregistered firm for the purpose of calculating penal interest imposed a double penalty, violating the objects of the Act and resulting in double jeopardy.

The court referred to the Supreme Court's reasoning in Jain Brothers v. Union of India, which upheld the legislature's right to withhold privileges from registered firms committing defaults. The court held that penal interest under Section 139(1) is by way of compensation for delayed tax collection and not a penalty. Therefore, it does not result in double jeopardy even when combined with penalties under Section 271.

The court also referenced decisions from the Madras and Gauhati High Courts, which supported the view that the legislature could impose additional burdens on registered firms failing to meet their legal obligations without violating Article 14.

Conclusion:
All three contentions raised by the petitioners were rejected. The court dismissed the special civil applications and upheld the orders levying penal interest. The petitioners were directed to pay the costs of the respondents in each case.

← Previous Next →