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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the Tribunal acted arbitrarily in not condoning the alleged delay in filing the appeals and in rejecting them as time-barred. 2. Whether there was any delay at all in filing the appeals. Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Arbitrary Action by the Tribunal in Not Condoning the Delay: The petitioner argued that the Tribunal acted arbitrarily by not condoning the alleged delay in filing the appeals and rejecting them as time-barred. The relevant legal provision is Section 32(1) of the Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1950, which stipulates that an appeal must be filed within sixty days from the date the Assistant Commissioner's order is communicated to the assessee. Furthermore, Section 32(3) allows the Appellate Tribunal to admit an appeal after the sixty-day period if there is sufficient cause for the delay. The petitioner complied with the Tribunal's notice to cure defects and filed the requisite papers on December 6, 1969, within the allowed time. The Tribunal dismissed the appeals as time-barred, stating the grounds for condonation were vague. The High Court found this to be an arbitrary exercise of discretion, noting that the petitioner acted on legal advice and there was no suggestion of secondary motives. The delay was only ten days, and the Tribunal failed to judiciously exercise its discretion by not considering the genuine controversy regarding the necessity of a certified copy of the order for filing the appeal. 2. Existence of Delay in Filing the Appeals: The second issue was whether there was any delay at all in filing the appeals. The petitioner contended that the period of limitation should be reckoned from the date of obtaining the certified copy of the order, as per Section 69 of the Act, which excludes the time requisite for obtaining such a copy. The Tribunal held that the copy communicated by the Assistant Commissioner sufficed, and thus, the certified copy obtained later could not be considered for reckoning the limitation period. The High Court disagreed, stating that the term "certified copy" as defined in Section 76 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, should apply. The High Court found that the copy communicated by the Assistant Commissioner did not meet the requirements of a certified copy under Section 76. Therefore, the petitioner was justified in obtaining a certified copy for filing the appeal, and the time taken for this should be excluded in computing the limitation period. Additionally, the High Court noted that separate appeals had to be filed for each assessment year, and the petitioner needed another certified copy for the second appeal. This further justified the exclusion of the time taken to obtain the certified copy. The High Court also criticized the Tribunal for not considering relevant precedents, such as the Division Bench decision in Malayalam Plantations Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, which supported the petitioner's contention. The Tribunal's dismissal of this precedent as irrelevant was deemed a failure to properly understand and apply binding judicial decisions. Conclusion: The High Court quashed the impugned orders (exhibits P-2 and P-4) and directed the Appellate Tribunal to restore the two appeals to its file and dispose of them on the merits according to law. The High Court emphasized the need for a judicious exercise of discretion in condoning delays and the importance of adhering to legal definitions and precedents in determining the period of limitation.
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