1971 (3) TMI 52 - SC - Customs

Statement made before a customs officer Explaining the provisions of Indian Penal Code does not amount to threat

Issues Involved:

1. Admissibility of the statement Ex. T. under Section 24 of the Evidence Act.
2. Application of Article 20(3) and Sections 24 and 25 of the Evidence Act.
3. Voluntariness and truthfulness of the statement Ex. T.
4. Whether the Customs Officer is considered a police officer under Section 25 of the Evidence Act.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Admissibility of the statement Ex. T. under Section 24 of the Evidence Act:

The primary issue in this appeal is whether Section 24 of the Evidence Act bars the admissibility of the statement Ex. T. given by the appellant to the Customs Officer under a summons issued under Section 108 of the Customs Act. The appellant contended that the statement was inadmissible because it was obtained through inducement, threat, or promise. However, the court found that the statement was voluntary and not influenced by any inducement, threat, or promise. The Customs Officer merely informed the appellant that he was bound to speak the truth as the inquiry was a judicial proceeding under Section 193 of the IPC. This statutory requirement to tell the truth does not constitute a threat from a person in authority under Section 24 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, the court held that Section 24 does not apply, and the statement Ex. T. was properly admitted in evidence.

2. Application of Article 20(3) and Sections 24 and 25 of the Evidence Act:

The appellant initially raised objections based on Article 20(3) and Sections 24 and 25 of the Evidence Act, arguing that the statement was inadmissible. However, these contentions were not pursued before the Supreme Court, as they had been resolved by previous decisions. The court reiterated that a Customs Officer conducting an inquiry under Section 108 of the Customs Act is not a police officer, and the person giving the statement does not stand in the character of an accused. Therefore, the statement is not hit by Article 20(3) or Section 25 of the Evidence Act.

3. Voluntariness and truthfulness of the statement Ex. T.:

Both the Presidency Magistrate and the High Court found that the statement Ex. T. was a voluntary and truthful disclosure made by the appellant. The appellant's allegations that he was forced to sign the statement under duress and that it was prepared by the Customs Officers were rejected. The courts concluded that the appellant's plea of being kept under illegal detention and coerced into making the statement was false. The independent corroboration of the statements contained in Ex. T. by other evidence on record further supported the conviction.

4. Whether the Customs Officer is considered a police officer under Section 25 of the Evidence Act:

The court referred to previous decisions, including Romesh Chandra Mehta v. State of West Bengal, which established that a Customs Officer is not a police officer within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act. The Customs Officer's role is to conduct inquiries for adjudicating forfeiture and penalties, not to investigate crimes triable by a Magistrate. Therefore, statements made to a Customs Officer under Sections 107 and 108 of the Customs Act are not covered by Section 25 of the Evidence Act. The court reaffirmed that the Customs Officer remains a revenue officer primarily concerned with detecting smuggling and enforcing customs duties.

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Section 24 of the Evidence Act does not apply to the statement Ex. T., as it was voluntary and not obtained through inducement, threat, or promise. The Customs Officer conducting the inquiry under Section 108 of the Customs Act is not a police officer, and the person giving the statement does not stand in the character of an accused. Therefore, the statement Ex. T. was properly admitted in evidence, and the conviction based on it was upheld.

← Previous Next →