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Issues Involved:
1. Classification of 'printed cartons' as products of the printing industry or packaging industry. 2. Validity of the Superintendent's demand and show cause notices. 3. Jurisdiction of the court to examine the validity of the notices. 4. Delay in challenging the notices. 5. Rights of the second petitioner (a shareholder) to challenge the notices. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Classification of 'Printed Cartons': The core issue was whether 'printed cartons' manufactured by the petitioner were products of the printing industry or the packaging industry. The petitioner argued that 'printed cartons' fell under the printing industry and were thus exempt from excise duty under Item No. 13 of the exemption notification. The respondents contended that 'printed cartons' were products of the packaging industry and therefore subject to excise duty. The court examined various treatises and legal precedents to determine the classification. It referenced the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Dunlop India Limited v. Union of India and others, which emphasized the importance of the commercial sense and popular meaning of terms in taxing statutes. The court found that 'printed cartons' should be classified as products of the printing industry, as they undergo similar processes and techniques as other printed materials like books and periodicals. 2. Validity of the Superintendent's Demand and Show Cause Notices: The petitioner challenged the Superintendent's demand and show cause notices issued after the Government's decision in Vijaya Flexible Container Limited's case, which reclassified 'printed cartons' as products of the packaging industry. The court held that the Superintendent's action, based on the later decision, was manifestly illegal. It found that the earlier decision in Allibhoy Sharufally's case, which classified 'printed cartons' as products of the printing industry, was correct. 3. Jurisdiction of the Court: The respondents argued that the petitioner should exhaust alternative remedies under the Act before approaching the court. The court rejected this objection, stating that the communication dated 15-9-1980 (Annexure E) could not be challenged in an appeal or revision under the Act. The court asserted its jurisdiction to examine the validity of the notices. 4. Delay in Challenging the Notices: The respondents contended that the petitioner had delayed challenging the notices. The court found no merit in this objection, noting that the delay was neither contumacious nor inordinate. The petitioner had contested the notices promptly upon receipt. 5. Rights of the Second Petitioner: The court dismissed the petition insofar as it related to the second petitioner, a shareholder, stating that she could not challenge actions initiated against the company. The court emphasized that this was not a case where a shareholder should be permitted to challenge the law or action against the company on the grounds of Article 19 of the Constitution. Conclusion: The court quashed the Superintendent's order dated 15-9-1980 and the show cause notices dated 24-9-1980. It issued a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to refund the excise duty collected from the petitioner on 'printed cartons' for the period during which the exemption was in force. The court allowed the respondents to adjust the refund against any other amounts due from the petitioner under the Act. The writ petition was disposed of with no order as to costs.
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