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2022 (2) TMI 935 - SC - Indian LawsRestraint from interfering with the ownership and possession of the Plaintiff - bonafide purchaser of property or not - whether the second Defendant was not having any authority to sell the land owned by the Plaintiff - suit for rendition of accounts - non-production of the original power of attorney by the second Defendant - HELD THAT - The argument of the Plaintiff that the non-production of the original power of attorney by the second Defendant, was fatal to a valid registration being effected, is rejected. The understanding of the Courts regarding Section 18A is also erroneous. Section 18A was enacted only to ensure that the copying process is hastened, as noticed from the Objects and Reasons. The Trial Court was right when it held that Section 18A is concerned only with the document which is presented for registration. The Trial Court clearly erred relying upon Section 18(A) to hold that certified copy however being produced of the power of attorney was in conformity with Section 18A and the High Court was equally in error to hold that Section 18A contemplated production of true copy of the power of attorney. Admittedly, the Plaintiff was the owner in possession of the property. It cannot be disputed that Plaintiff entered into an agreement with the first Defendant to sell the property. What is disputed is the price. On the one hand, the Plaintiff contends that the price was fixed at ₹ 55,000/-. The Defendants dispute the said version. According to them, the property was conveyed by the second Defendant acting as the power of attorney holder on behalf of the Plaintiff in favour of the first Defendant for a total consideration of ₹ 30,000/-. The execution of power of attorney dated 28.01.1987, by the Plaintiff in favour of the second Defendant is not in dispute. Re-appreciation of evidences - HELD THAT - The High Court has overstepped its limits by reappreciating the evidence, a task which must be left to the First Appellate Court. It is true that the First Appellate Court did not fully conform to the requirements of Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The property is banjar land. Quite clearly, the Plaintiff wanted to sell the land. He has admittedly executed the Power of Attorney in favour of the second Defendant - The agreement dated 30.01.1987, was entered into and it refers to the power of attorney dated 28.01.1987. The power of attorney is, undoubtedly, registered. If the Plaintiff's case is believed, P-1 agreement is executed by the second Defendant, which recites that he has been appointed as the power of attorney. It is further recited that the second Defendant, on behalf of the Plaintiff, has made a deal to sell the property for ₹ 55,000/-. It is stated still further that the first Defendant did not have the total amount of consideration. He wanted a weeks' time to arrange the money. For this reason, it is finally stated that the Plaintiff had appointed him as the power of attorney because the Plaintiff had to urgently go to Kinnaur. Finally, it is stated in P-1 that therefore, he would now be able to sell the land only for ₹ 55,000/-, otherwise, he would be unable to sell. Since, it is not disputed that the Plaintiff did execute the power of attorney, empowering the second Defendant to sell the property and it is further not in dispute that the second Defendant has executed the sale deed in favour of the first Defendant, the only question which arises is whether the power of attorney was cancelled before the execution of the sale deed on 28.04.1987. Whether the cancellation was effected in a valid and legal manner? - whether it was made known to not only to the second Defendant but also to the first Defendant? - HELD THAT - Section 201 of the Contract Act, dealing with termination of agency, declares that an agency can be terminated by the principal revoking the authority of the agent. An exception to the power of principal to revoke the agency is found in Section 202 of the Contract Act, which provides that where an agent has himself an interest in the property which forms the subject of the agency, in the absence of an express contract, the agency cannot be terminated to the prejudice of the agent's interest. In such cases, the agency would be clearly irrevocable. Section 207 of the Contract Act declares that revocation may be express or may be implied in the conduct of that principal or agent, respectively - It is no doubt true that the case of the Plaintiff is that the second Defendant was bereft of the authority to transfer the property as on 28.04.1987 in view of the fact that the second Defendant had surrendered the power of attorney dated 28.01.1987 on 02.02.1987 and the Plaintiff had produced the document. The second Defendant has denied the case of surrender before the execution of sale deed. It is apparent that whatever may be the state of the oral evidence and the difficulty in arriving at the truth on an appreciation of the same, the documents which we have adverted to, unerringly points to the following facts. Contrary to the case of the Plaintiff that the power of attorney stood cancelled on 02.02.1987, after it was surrendered to him on that day, it is that the Plaintiff writes to the second Defendant about having spoken to the second Defendant regarding the land in question at Mehre and also gave him the power of attorney. There is no mention about the power of attorney having been surrendered on 02.02.1987 or about the so-called cancellation of the same - the case of the Plaintiff that he had cancelled the power of attorney by writing the word 'cancelled' on 02.02.1987, upon it being surrendered by the second Defendant, cannot be accepted. The proceeding on the basis that the second Defendant had a duty to not sell the property below ₹ 55,000/-, in terms of P-1, the breach of duty to not sell below ₹ 55,000/-, when the second Defendant sold the property for ₹ 30,000/-, cannot invalidate the sale or render it null and void. A perusal of the power of attorney will make it clear that any restriction on the price is conspicuous by its absence in the power of attorney. Appeal allowed - decided in favor of appellant.
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the sale deed and consideration. 2. Entitlement to relief of declaration and permanent injunction. 3. Entitlement to rendition of accounts from the second Defendant. 4. Estoppel from filing the suit. 5. Proper valuation for court fee and jurisdiction. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Validity of the Sale Deed and Consideration: The Plaintiff claimed that the sale deed executed by the second Defendant was fraudulent and void, alleging it was done without proper authority and for a lesser consideration of ?30,000 instead of the agreed ?55,000. The Plaintiff argued that the power of attorney was canceled before the sale deed execution. The High Court found that the power of attorney was indeed canceled on 02.02.1987, and thus, the second Defendant was not competent to execute the sale deed. The Trial Court, however, found the sale deed valid, supported by the sub-registrar's testimony and the marginal witnesses, and concluded that the sale was conducted legally for ?30,000. 2. Entitlement to Relief of Declaration and Permanent Injunction: The Plaintiff sought a declaration that he was the owner in possession of the property and that the mutation showing the sale in favor of the first Defendant was null and void. The High Court decreed the suit, declaring the Plaintiff as the owner and invalidating the mutation. The Trial Court, however, declined the relief of declaration by way of permanent injunction, concluding that the Plaintiff was not the owner in possession. 3. Entitlement to Rendition of Accounts from the Second Defendant: The Plaintiff alternatively sought rendition of accounts from the second Defendant. The Trial Court found the Plaintiff entitled to this relief, ordering the second Defendant to pay ?55,000 based on the agreement (P1). The agreement controlled the power of attorney, and the agent could not act against the principal's interest. 4. Estoppel from Filing the Suit: The issue of estoppel was raised, questioning whether the Plaintiff's conduct barred him from filing the suit. The Trial Court did not find the Plaintiff estopped from filing the suit, focusing instead on the validity of the power of attorney and the sale transaction. 5. Proper Valuation for Court Fee and Jurisdiction: The Trial Court found that the court fee of ?19.50 was correctly fixed, addressing the issue of proper valuation for court fee and jurisdiction. Analysis and Conclusion: The Supreme Court analyzed the provisions of the Registration Act, particularly Sections 32, 33, and 34, and concluded that the production of the original power of attorney was not necessary for the sale deed's registration. The Court found that the Plaintiff's claim of canceling the power of attorney on 02.02.1987 was not credible, especially in light of the correspondence (Exhibit-DX) indicating the Plaintiff's continued recognition of the power of attorney. The High Court's reappreciation of evidence was deemed inappropriate under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as it overstepped its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, restoring the Trial Court's findings that the sale deed was valid and the Plaintiff was not entitled to the relief of declaration and permanent injunction but was entitled to rendition of accounts from the second Defendant. The appeal was allowed, and the impugned judgment was set aside, with parties bearing their respective costs.
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