1990 (1) TMI 87 - HC - Central Excise

Summary

Issues:
Challenge to excise duty orders on wrapping paper utilization for packing various types of paper, applicability of trade practices, promissory estoppel, binding effect of notifications and trade notices.

Analysis:
The writ petitioner challenged excise duty orders on wrapping paper used for packing paper, alleging the orders were contrary to trade practices and representations made by Central Excise Authorities. The petitioner contended that duty on wrapping paper should be paid at rates applicable to the packed paper, citing relevant trade notices. The petitioner also argued that the respondents were bound by their representations, invoking the principle of promissory estoppel. The petitioner relied on various legal precedents to support their arguments, emphasizing that any change in practice should not have retrospective effect.

The Revenue Authorities contested the writ petition, asserting that the impugned orders were justified under the Central Excise Rules. They argued that the steps taken by the respondents were in accordance with the law, and the petitioner's grievances were unfounded.

The Court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Collector of Central Excise v. Eastend Papers and Industries Limited, which held that wrapping paper used in packing paper should be treated as raw materials or component parts. The Court also considered the concept of promissory estoppel in various cases, emphasizing the binding nature of trade notices on the Department. The Court analyzed the legal principles related to excise duty, including the assessable value and the scope of value under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.

After considering the arguments and legal precedents, the Court found that the petitioner's claims lacked merit. The Court concluded that the petitioner was not entitled to avoid the duties levied by the authorities, as the theory of promissory estoppel could not be extended without evidence of specific assurance and change in position by the petitioner. Therefore, the Court dismissed the writ petition, discharged the Rule, and vacated all interim orders, with no order as to costs.