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Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the Writ Petition. 2. Entitlement to refund of import duty and applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Detailed Analysis: Issue 1: Jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the Writ Petition The petitioner operates a business in Karnataka but imported goods through Bombay, where customs duty was levied. The petitioner sought a refund in Bombay and pursued statutory appeals outside Karnataka. The primary question is whether any part of the cause of action arose in Karnataka. The term "cause of action" encompasses all essential facts required to support a claim. The mere fact that the petitioner is located in Karnataka does not constitute a part of this essential bundle of facts. Article 226(2) of the Constitution allows a High Court to issue writs if any part of the cause of action arises within its jurisdiction, even if the respondent is outside the state. However, this does not extend to actions or inactions by the Central Government unless they have a reasonable nexus within the High Court's territorial jurisdiction. Several precedents were cited to illustrate this principle: - In Shiv Shankar Lal Gupta v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, the Delhi High Court held that the writ petition was not maintainable because the cause of action arose in Bombay. - In M/s. Asiatic Labour Corporation v. Union Of India, the Gujarat High Court rejected the petition as the contract's execution was outside Gujarat. - In Bharat Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, the Calcutta High Court dismissed the petition as the cause of action arose in Bihar. - The Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. M/s. Swaika Properties held that mere service of notice in West Bengal did not constitute a cause of action for challenging land acquisition in Rajasthan. Applying these principles, the court concluded that the cause of action for challenging the customs duty levy arose entirely outside Karnataka. Therefore, the preliminary objection regarding jurisdiction was upheld. Issue 2: Entitlement to refund of import duty and applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel The petitioner argued that the exemption notifications in force when the contract was entered into should apply, invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel to prevent the levy of duty after the notifications were superseded. The court examined whether the power to grant exemptions under Section 25 of the Customs Act is legislative or executive. The Supreme Court in Indian Express Newspaper v. Union of India assumed it to be a legislative power and held that subordinate legislation could be questioned for being unreasonable or arbitrary but did not extend the doctrine of promissory estoppel to legislative actions. The principle that estoppel cannot operate against statute was reiterated in Union Of India v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd., where it was held that promissory estoppel cannot be used to compel the government to act against statutory provisions. The court distinguished the present case from others where promissory estoppel was applied, such as: - M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v. State of Uttar Pradesh, where the factory was established during the exemption period. - Pournami Oil Mills v. State of Kerala, where industries set up during the exemption period were entitled to the benefit. The court emphasized that customs duty is levied when goods cross the customs barrier, and exemption notifications depend on public interest and revenue exigencies. Importers are aware of the risks in international trade, including fluctuating policies. The court concluded that it would be inequitable to compel the government to keep an exemption notification alive indefinitely to benefit contracts entered into during its validity. Thus, the petitioner's claim for a refund based on promissory estoppel was dismissed. Conclusion: The Writ Petition was dismissed on both jurisdictional grounds and merits, with no order as to costs.
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