1991 (1) TMI 157 - HC - Central Excise

Summary

Issues:
- Interpretation of Central Excise Rules regarding exemption for PTFE sheets
- Validity of the impugned notification of 1978 and trade notice of 1979
- Definition of "flexible" and "rigid" articles made of plastics
- Power of the Central Government to define terms contrary to ordinary meaning
- Consistency of impugned notification with Tariff Item 15A

Analysis:

The judgment revolves around the interpretation of Central Excise Rules concerning the exemption for PTFE sheets. The petitioner, a manufacturer of PTFE sheets, claimed exemption under a 1971 notification exempting articles made of plastics falling under Tariff Item 15A(2). The Central Government later issued a notification in 1978, defining "flexible" and "rigid" articles made of plastics, potentially affecting the petitioner's eligibility for exemption.

The petitioner argued that the 1978 notification and subsequent trade notice altered the classification of PTFE sheets from semi-rigid to rigid, impacting their exemption status. The petitioner contended that the Central Government exceeded its rule-making power by defining "flexible" and "rigid" in an arbitrary manner, contrary to ordinary meanings. Citing precedents, the petitioner asserted that the impugned notification deviated from the true meaning of the terms as used in Tariff Item 15A.

The court considered the petitioner's arguments and held the impugned notification of 1978 invalid. The court agreed that the definitions provided in the notification were inconsistent with the ordinary understanding of "flexible" and "rigid" in the context of Tariff Item 15A. Consequently, the Central Government's attempt to reclassify PTFE sheets as rigid articles was deemed beyond its rule-making power.

In conclusion, the court allowed the petition, declaring the 1978 notification invalid and restraining its implementation. The respondents were directed to determine any refund due to the petitioner within three months and grant it accordingly. The court made the rule absolute with no order as to costs, emphasizing the importance of consistency between rule-making and statutory provisions in matters of excise duty exemptions.