1992 (12) TMI 52 - HC - Customs

Summary

Issues:
1. Jurisdiction of the Government of India in dealing with revisions filed by the petitioner.
2. Violation of principles of natural justice due to lack of personal hearing for the petitioner.

Analysis:

Issue 1: Jurisdiction of the Government of India
The petitioner filed a writ petition seeking the issuance of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to challenge the order of the Government of India on a Customs Revision application. The petitioner contended that after the notified date, the Government of India would no longer have jurisdiction to deal with the revision filed by the petitioner. The petitioner relied on Section 131B of the Customs Act, 1962. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the proper revisional authority would be the Appellate Tribunal if the value of the subject matter exceeded Rs. 10,000. On the other hand, the Additional Central Government Standing Counsel argued that in cases of absolute confiscation without an option for paying redemption fine, the Government of India remains the proper revisional authority. The court analyzed Section 131B(2) of the Customs Act, 1962, and concluded that the ceiling of Rs. 10,000 applies independently to each clause (a), (b), and (c). As the impugned order of the Government of India was found to be without jurisdiction and violated principles of natural justice by not providing a personal hearing to the petitioner, the court quashed the order and remanded the matter to the Appellate Tribunal for further hearing.

Issue 2: Violation of Principles of Natural Justice
The petitioner raised a second ground challenging the order of the first respondent, stating that the petitioner was not given a personal hearing, which vitiates the order. The learned counsel for the Revenue agreed that the failure to provide a personal hearing to the petitioner affected the validity of the order. The court concurred with this view and held that the absence of a personal hearing for the petitioner violated the principles of natural justice. Consequently, the court set aside the impugned order of the first respondent and directed the concerned Appellate Tribunal to hear the matter afresh, giving the petitioner a reasonable opportunity within a specified time frame of four months from the date of the judgment.

In conclusion, the court allowed the writ petition, quashed the order of the first respondent, and remanded the matter to the Appellate Tribunal for further proceedings in accordance with the law, emphasizing the importance of providing the petitioner with a fair opportunity to present their case.