1992 (11) TMI 112 - HC - Customs

Summary

Issues:
- Interpretation of promissory estoppel in the context of customs regulations.
- Whether regulations framed under Section 157 of the Customs Act can be considered as statutes.
- The applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel against regulations framed under Section 157 of the Customs Act.

Analysis:
The judgment involves a batch of writ petitions where the petitioners raised a plea of promissory estoppel concerning customs duty regulations. The petitioners, a private limited company dealing in photographic processes, imported goods under Tariff Item No. 84.66 before changes were made to the Customs Tariff Act in 1986. The petitioners entered into a contract based on the existing regulations and sought the benefit of concessional rates. However, subsequent changes in regulations adversely affected their claim for concessional duty rates.

The petitioners argued that the change in regulations deprived them of the benefit they were entitled to under the previous provisions. They invoked the doctrine of promissory estoppel based on the representations in the regulations and sought relief based on their reliance on the previous tariff entry. The respondents, represented by the Assistant Collector of Customs, contended that promissory estoppel cannot be invoked against statutory regulations, emphasizing that the new regulations were framed under Section 157 of the Customs Act.

The court analyzed the issue of whether regulations framed under Section 157 of the Customs Act can be considered statutes. It distinguished between regulations framed under Section 157 and rules framed under other sections, noting that regulations under Section 157 are for carrying out the Act's objectives. The court expressed a prima facie opinion that such regulations may not be on par with rules framed under other sections that require parliamentary approval.

The court disagreed with a previous Division Bench decision that held promissory estoppel cannot be applied against regulations framed under Section 157. It raised the question for a larger bench to consider whether such regulations can be termed as statutes and if the doctrine of promissory estoppel can be invoked against them. The court directed the papers to be placed before the Chief Justice for further orders, indicating the need for reconsideration of the previous decision on this matter.

In conclusion, the judgment delves into the intricacies of promissory estoppel in the context of customs regulations, highlighting the debate over the nature of regulations framed under Section 157 of the Customs Act and their susceptibility to the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The court's decision to seek reconsideration on this issue signifies the importance of clarifying the legal standing of such regulations in relation to promissory estoppel.