1996 (8) TMI 116 - SC - Customs

Whether in the proved facts and circumstances the courts below were justified in taking recourse to the statutory presumption under Section 138A of the Customs Act? Held that - The answer must be in the affirmative. The fact that accused was found to be inside the vehicle from which the silver ingots were recovered; the fact that the vehicle did not stop even though customs authorities signalled for stopping; the fact that the two courts below disbelieved the plea of accused-Devchand about the break down of his fiat car and he is taking an innocent lift by the ambassador car from the secret pocket of which the silver ingots were recovered; and that the place from where the recovery was made is undoubtedly a place within the notified area under Section 11K of the Act and further that there was no transport voucher as required under Section 11K of the Act, unhesitatingly point towards the complicity of the accused-Devchand in the commission of offence under Section 135(1) and the presumption under Section 138A having been rightly attracted. The burden lay on the accused-appellant to establish that either he did not know about the fact of silver ingots being transported in the vehicle or that he was in no way connected with the same. But the accused-Devehand has utterly failed to discharge the said burden. In our considered opinion the conviction must be held to be well founded and the sentence passed thereunder is wholly justified. So far as Jayantilal is concerned no convincing argument has been advanced on his behalf to interfere with the findings and conclusions arrived at by the courts below and consequently we do not find any case warranting interference by this Court has been made out. Appeal dismissed.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Disbelief of appellant-Devchand's plea regarding the breakdown of his fiat car and his unawareness of the silver ingots in the ambassador car.
2. Presumption under Section 138A of the Customs Act.
3. Appropriateness of sentencing considering the time already served by the appellants.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Disbelief of Appellant-Devchand's Plea:
The appellants were charged under Section 135(1)(a) of the Customs Act for carrying silver without a transport voucher in a specified area. The prosecution's case was based on secret information received by customs authorities, leading to the interception of an ambassador car from which ten silver ingots were recovered. Appellant-Devchand claimed his fiat car broke down, and he took a lift in the ambassador car, unaware of the silver ingots. Both the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate and the High Court rejected this plea, finding it fictitious and inconsistent. The courts relied on oral and documentary evidence, statutory presumption under Section 138A, and contradictions in the accused's statements. The Supreme Court affirmed these findings, noting no infirmity in the appreciation of evidence and rejecting the appellant's plea as it found no perversity or ignored evidence.

2. Presumption under Section 138A of the Customs Act:
Section 138A of the Customs Act allows for a presumption of culpable mental state in prosecutions under the Act. The appellants contended that the prosecution must first establish the basic ingredients of the offence under Section 135(1)(a) before invoking this presumption. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the legislative intent behind Section 138A was to address difficulties in proving culpable mental state in economic offences. The court held that the facts-such as the presence of the accused in the vehicle, the vehicle's failure to stop, and the lack of a transport voucher-justified the presumption under Section 138A. The burden then shifted to the accused to prove their lack of knowledge or involvement, which they failed to do. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction and sentence, finding the presumption rightly applied and the burden not discharged by the appellants.

3. Appropriateness of Sentencing Considering Time Served:
The appellants argued for leniency, citing the time already served (15 months for appellant-Devchand and 18 months for appellant-Jayantilal) and the passage of time since the offence in 1980. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, emphasizing the seriousness of economic offences like smuggling and tax evasion. The court noted the significant impact of such offences on legitimate trade and revenue, and the need for stringent measures to combat them. The court held that leniency in such cases would send the wrong signal and undermine efforts to control smuggling and economic offences. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, directing the appellants to surrender and serve the remaining sentence.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the conviction and enhanced sentences imposed by the High Court. The court upheld the application of the presumption under Section 138A of the Customs Act and rejected the appellants' pleas for leniency based on time already served. The appellants were directed to surrender to serve the balance of their sentences.