2004 (4) TMI 666 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Computation of the period for filing revision petitions.
2. Date of knowledge of the grant for filing revision petitions.
3. Scope of the High Court's power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.
4. Constructive knowledge of the grant.
5. Legality of the grant exceeding 4 kms on served sectors.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Computation of the Period for Filing Revision Petitions:
The learned counsel for the review applicants argued that certain periods were not considered while computing the 30-day period for filing revision petitions. They contended that if these periods were included, the revision petitions would be barred by limitation. Specifically, they pointed out delays in filing copy applications and writ petitions, which cumulatively exceeded the 30-day limit. The court, however, maintained that it had already considered the relevant dates and delays in its judgment and found no merit in the review applications.

2. Date of Knowledge of the Grant for Filing Revision Petitions:
The court had previously determined that the date of knowledge for the appellants to file revision petitions was when the vehicles were put into operation on tentative timings. The court held that the period of operation without a timing conference could not be considered for computing the 30-day period. This was to avoid ratifying unauthorized operations by vehicles without fixed timings as per Rule 248. The review applicants' contention that the date of knowledge was earlier was not accepted.

3. Scope of the High Court's Power of Review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC:
The court reiterated the principles laid down by the Supreme Court regarding the scope of review. Review proceedings are not an appeal and are confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. An error apparent on the face of the record must be self-evident and not require a long process of reasoning. The court found no such error in its original judgment and thus dismissed the review applications.

4. Constructive Knowledge of the Grant:
The review applicants argued that the appellants had constructive knowledge of the grant as they made representations before filing copy applications. The court rejected this argument, stating that the period during which vehicles operated without fixed timings could not be counted for the purpose of calculating the limitation period.

5. Legality of the Grant Exceeding 4 Kms on Served Sectors:
In Review Application No. 70 of 2004, the appellant contended that the permit granted beyond 4 kms on served sectors was illegal. The court dismissed this contention, stating that once the revision petition was rejected on the ground of being barred by limitation, the legality of the order under revision did not arise. Consequently, the review application was dismissed.

Conclusion:
The court found no merit in the review applications and dismissed them. It upheld its original judgment, emphasizing that the power of review is limited to correcting errors apparent on the face of the record and not for rehearing and correcting erroneous decisions. The court also clarified that the period of unauthorized vehicle operation without fixed timings could not be considered for computing the limitation period.