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2005 (3) TMI 832 - SC - Indian Laws

Issues Involved:

1. Maintainability of the suit for want of notice under Section 120 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963.
2. Bar of limitation under Section 120 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963.
3. Constitutionality of Section 120 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963.
4. Waiver of the plea of limitation and statutory notice by the respondent Board.
5. Whether the letter dated 12.04.1984 can be treated as notice under Section 120 of the Act.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Maintainability of the Suit for Want of Notice under Section 120 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963:

The appellant's suit was dismissed by the District Judge on the grounds of non-maintainability for want of notice under Section 120 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963. The High Court affirmed this decision, holding that the letter dated 12.04.1984 could not be considered as a notice under Section 120 of the Act. Section 120 mandates that no suit shall be commenced against the Board or its members for anything done under the Act until one month after a notice in writing has been given to the Board or after six months from the accrual of the cause of action. The appellant failed to comply with this requirement, and thus, the suit was deemed not maintainable.

2. Bar of Limitation under Section 120 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963:

The High Court held that the suit was barred by limitation as it was filed beyond the six-month period prescribed under Section 120 of the Act. The appellant argued that the limitation period should be waived due to the partial decree passed on admission under Order 12, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, the Court found that the plea of limitation could not be waived and that it was the duty of the Court to dismiss any suit instituted after the prescribed period of limitation, as mandated by Section 3 of the Limitation Act. The suit was filed on 11.09.1986, well beyond the six-month period from the accrual of the cause of action on 16.06.1984, making it time-barred.

3. Constitutionality of Section 120 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963:

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of Section 120, arguing that the shorter limitation period of six months was arbitrary, excessive, and violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. The High Court rejected this challenge, citing the rationale behind the shorter limitation period for public bodies and officials to ensure that legal proceedings are initiated expeditiously while evidence is fresh. The Court referred to previous judgments, including Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. The Premier Automobiles Ltd., which upheld similar provisions. The classification was found to have a reasonable nexus to the object sought to be achieved, and the provision was deemed constitutionally valid.

4. Waiver of the Plea of Limitation and Statutory Notice by the Respondent Board:

The appellant contended that the respondent Board had waived the plea of limitation and statutory notice by not raising these objections when admitting the claim of Rs.7,09,835/- under Order 12, Rule 6. However, the Court held that waiver is a question of fact that must be properly pleaded and proved. The appellant had not pleaded waiver at any stage of the proceedings, and the issue was raised for the first time during arguments before the High Court. The Court cited Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, emphasizing that waiver must be pleaded and cannot be raised without proper factual foundation. Consequently, the plea of waiver was rejected.

5. Whether the Letter Dated 12.04.1984 Can Be Treated as Notice under Section 120 of the Act:

The appellant argued that the letter dated 12.04.1984 should be treated as a notice under Section 120 of the Act. The Court found that the letter could not be considered as such a notice because it did not set out the cause of action as required by Section 120. The cause of action arose on 16.06.1984 when the respondent Board refused the appellant's request for a full rebate. Since the letter dated 12.04.1984 predated the accrual of the cause of action, it could not fulfill the statutory requirement of notice. The absence of a proper notice under Section 120 rendered the suit non-maintainable.

Conclusion:

The appeals were dismissed, and the judgments of the lower courts were affirmed. The suit was held to be barred by limitation, not maintainable for want of statutory notice, and Section 120 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963, was deemed constitutionally valid.

 

 

 

 

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