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Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the Delhi courts to entertain complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. 2. Interpretation of acts constituting the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act. 3. The significance of "giving notice" in terms of jurisdiction and limitation under Section 138 of the NI Act. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Jurisdiction of the Delhi Courts: The primary issue was whether the courts in Delhi had jurisdiction to entertain complaints under Section 138 of the NI Act. The respondent company presented the cheques for collection with its banker in Delhi, and notices were issued from Delhi. However, the petitioners contended that the cheques were drawn in Mumbai, and the drawee bank was located in Mumbai. The court analyzed the jurisdictional aspect with reference to Sections 177, 178, and 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Supreme Court's decision in K. Bhaskaran v. Shankaran Vaidhyan Balan. The court concluded that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the location where the offence or part of the offence is committed. The acts constituting the offence under Section 138, as identified by the Supreme Court, include drawing the cheque, presenting it to the bank, returning it unpaid, giving notice in writing, and failure to make payment. The court held that the presentation of the cheque and its return unpaid must occur at the drawee bank, which was in Mumbai, not Delhi. Therefore, the Delhi courts lacked jurisdiction. 2. Interpretation of Acts Constituting the Offence: The court examined the acts constituting the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act, as elucidated in Bhaskaran's case. These acts include drawing the cheque, presenting it to the bank, returning it unpaid, giving notice in writing, and the drawer's failure to pay. The court emphasized that the presentation of the cheque must occur at the drawee bank, as clarified in Ishar Alloy Steels Ltd. v. Jayaswals Neco Ltd., where the Supreme Court held that "the bank" refers to the drawee bank. Consequently, the acts of presenting the cheque and its return unpaid are confined to the location of the drawee bank, which in this case was Mumbai. 3. The Significance of "Giving Notice": The court addressed the interpretation of "giving notice" under proviso (b) to Section 138 of the NI Act. The Supreme Court in Bhaskaran's case held that "giving notice" means sending the notice, which is relevant for starting the limitation period. However, in Harman Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v. National Panasonic India Pvt. Ltd., the Supreme Court clarified that for jurisdictional purposes, "giving notice" means the receipt of notice by the drawer. The court reconciled these interpretations by acknowledging that the same expression can have different meanings in different contexts. For limitation purposes, "giving notice" means sending, while for jurisdictional purposes, it means receipt. Therefore, the act of sending the notice from Delhi did not confer jurisdiction on the Delhi courts. Conclusion: The court concluded that no part of the cause of action arose in Delhi, as the essential acts constituting the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act occurred in Mumbai. Consequently, the petitions were disposed of by quashing the impugned orders and directing the complaints to be returned for filing in a court with the appropriate territorial jurisdiction. No costs were awarded.
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