1991 (3) TMI 407 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:

1. Validity of the Karnataka Ordinance No. 2 of 1991 under Article 213 of the Constitution.
2. Whether the promulgation of the Ordinance was a colorable exercise of power.
3. Allegations of mala fides in the promulgation of the Ordinance.
4. Urgency and necessity for the promulgation of the Ordinance.
5. Violation of Article 14 of the Constitution by the Ordinance.
6. Judicial scrutiny of the Governor's satisfaction under Article 213.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Validity of the Karnataka Ordinance No. 2 of 1991 under Article 213 of the Constitution:
The primary contention was that the Ordinance, which amended Section 167 of the Karnataka Zilla Parishads Act, allowing the removal of Adhyakshas and Upadhyakshas by a simple majority instead of a two-thirds majority, was invalid. The court examined the legislative competence of the Governor under Article 213, which allows the promulgation of an ordinance when the legislature is not in session. The court held that the ordinance-making power is legislative in nature and carries the same force as an Act of the legislature. It cannot be challenged on grounds of non-application of mind or mala fides, similar to legislative acts.

2. Whether the promulgation of the Ordinance was a colorable exercise of power:
The petitioners argued that the ordinance was a colorable exercise of power aimed at political gains, as it allowed the Congress-I party, which had a simple majority, to dislodge the existing office holders. The court rejected this contention, stating that the motivation of individual cabinet members cannot be attributed to the collective decision of the Council of Ministers, which advised the Governor. The court emphasized that legislative discretion is not subject to judicial scrutiny regarding its propriety or expediency.

3. Allegations of mala fides in the promulgation of the Ordinance:
The petitioners alleged mala fides against the Minister for Rural Development and Panchayat Raj, asserting his influence over the ordinance. The court dismissed these allegations, emphasizing that the ordinance was promulgated based on the advice of the Council of Ministers, and any individual motive does not taint the collective decision.

4. Urgency and necessity for the promulgation of the Ordinance:
The petitioners questioned the urgency of the ordinance, given that a bill on the same subject was already pending in the legislature. The court held that the satisfaction of the Governor regarding the necessity of immediate action is not justiciable. The court reiterated that the Governor acts as the legislature when promulgating an ordinance, and the timing and necessity are matters for the legislative authority to decide.

5. Violation of Article 14 of the Constitution by the Ordinance:
The petitioners argued that the ordinance violated Article 14 by selectively targeting the offices of Adhyakshas and Upadhyakshas for removal by a simple majority, unlike other elected offices requiring a two-thirds majority. The court rejected this contention, noting that the nature and powers of these offices are distinct and justify different treatment. The ordinance did not violate the equality clause as it addressed specific administrative needs.

6. Judicial scrutiny of the Governor's satisfaction under Article 213:
The court discussed the scope of judicial review concerning the Governor's satisfaction under Article 213. It concluded that the satisfaction of the Governor in promulgating an ordinance is not subject to judicial scrutiny, as it involves legislative discretion. The court relied on precedents, including the Supreme Court's decision in T. Venkata Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, which established that the satisfaction of the Governor is non-justiciable.

Conclusion:
The writ petitions were dismissed, affirming the validity of the Karnataka Ordinance No. 2 of 1991. The court held that the ordinance-making power under Article 213 is legislative, and the Governor's satisfaction regarding the necessity of the ordinance is not open to judicial review. The ordinance did not violate Article 14, as the differentiation in the removal process was justified by the unique nature of the offices involved. The court granted a certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court, recognizing the substantial question of law regarding the interpretation of Article 213. An interim order was issued to maintain the status quo until the petitioners could approach the Supreme Court.