2016 (8) TMI 1611 - SC - Indian Laws

Time limitation for initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the Appellant - Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules 1972 - Whether the impugned judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court correctly appreciates the scope of Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) of the CCS (Pension) Rules 1972 in light of the fact the disciplinary proceedings were initiated more than four years after the alleged incidents? - Whether the impugned judgment and order is erroneous and is vitiated in law? HELD THAT - The High Court quashed the Memorandum of Charges on the ground that it was issued after four years from the date of the alleged incident. Therefore it was held that the said action of the Disciplinary Authority in initiating disciplinary proceedings is not valid in law as the same was barred by limitation as per the provision of Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) of the CCS (Pension) Rules 1972. This important legal aspect of the case was not considered by the Division Bench of the High Court while setting aside the common judgment and order dated 01.09.2010 passed by the learned single Judge in Writ Petition No. 904 of 2008 (arms and ammunitions case) and Writ Petition No. 264 of 2010 (contraband ganja case). It is a well established principle of law that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute then the act must be done in that manner or not at all. The Division Bench of the High Court failed to appreciate the fact that liberty had been granted by the High Court vide its judgment and order dated 07.11.2006 in W.A. (C) No. 45 of 2006 to the Disciplinary Authority to take disciplinary action against the Appellant. Thus there was no need for the Respondent Disciplinary Authority to withdraw the Memorandum of Charges dated 14.05.1998 for the purpose of initiating disciplinary proceedings afresh against the Appellant on the same charges by obtaining an order of sanction from the President of India as required under Rule 9(2)(b)(i) of the CCS (Pension) Rules 1972. The Division Bench of the High Court in its judgment and order dated 05.08.2013 has completely ignored this important legal aspect of the matter that the prior sanction accorded by the President under the above said Rules was in fact barred by limitation. Thus it has committed serious error in law in arriving at the conclusion that the Respondent Disciplinary Authority had obtained due sanction from the President of India to conduct the departmental proceedings against the Appellant for the same charges which action was barred by limitation as provided under Rule 9(2) (b)(ii) of CCS (Pension) Rules 1972. Therefore the impugned judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court cannot be allowed to sustain in law. Conclusion - In the instant case the action of the Disciplinary Authority is untenable in law for the reason that the interpretation of the CCS (Pension) Rules 1972 which is sought to be made by the learned ASG on behalf of the Respondents amounts to deprivation of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed to the Appellant under Part III of the Constitution of India. Therefore the disciplinary proceedings initiated by the disciplinary authority after obtaining sanction from the President of India under Rule 9(2)(b)(i) of the CCS (Pension) Rules 1972 are liable to be quashed. Appeals are partly allowed only to the extent of answering the legal questions framed and the impugned judgment and order is set aside to that extent with the above liberty given to the Respondents - application disposed off.

Summary

1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED

The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:

• Whether the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the Appellant was barred by the limitation period prescribed under Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972.
• Whether the impugned judgment and order of the Division Bench of the High Court was erroneous in law.
• What should be the final order in light of the legal findings?

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue 1: Limitation on Disciplinary Proceedings

• Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The case revolves around Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, which stipulates that disciplinary proceedings cannot be initiated in respect of events that occurred more than four years prior to the initiation of such proceedings. The case of State of U.P. v. Shri Krishna Pandey was cited, which held that proceedings against a retired government employee must be initiated within four years of the incident.
• Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court noted that the Appellant retired on 31.08.2006, and the fresh memorandum of charges was issued on 22.08.2008, well beyond the four-year limitation period. The Court emphasized that the statutory requirement under Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) was not met, rendering the proceedings invalid.
• Key Evidence and Findings: The Appellant was initially charged with misconduct related to missing arms and contraband ganja. The High Court had previously quashed the disciplinary proceedings due to procedural lapses, granting liberty to initiate fresh proceedings, which the Respondents did beyond the permissible period.
• Application of Law to Facts: The Court applied the rule of law that mandates adherence to procedural timelines, finding that the Respondents' actions were barred by the statutory limitation period.
• Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Respondents argued that prior sanction from the President allowed for proceedings beyond the four-year limit. However, the Court found that such sanction did not override the clear statutory limitation, emphasizing the need for adherence to procedural rules.
• Conclusions: The Court concluded that the disciplinary proceedings were time-barred and thus invalid under Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972.

Issue 2: Validity of the High Court's Judgment

• Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The Court examined the High Court's interpretation of Rule 9(2)(b)(ii) and the application of precedents such as Babu Verghese v. Bar Council of Kerala, which underscores the necessity to follow statutory procedures.
• Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court found that the High Court erred in allowing the disciplinary proceedings to continue despite the clear statutory bar, failing to appreciate the mandatory nature of the limitation period.
• Key Evidence and Findings: The evidence showed that the High Court had misinterpreted the applicability of Rule 9(2)(b)(ii), leading to an erroneous decision to allow proceedings to continue.
• Application of Law to Facts: By applying the statutory limitation period, the Court determined that the High Court's judgment was legally unsustainable.
• Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Respondents' reliance on presidential sanction was dismissed as insufficient to bypass statutory limitations, reinforcing the principle that statutory mandates must be strictly adhered to.
• Conclusions: The Court concluded that the High Court's judgment was erroneous and needed to be set aside.

3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

• Preserve Verbatim Quotes of Crucial Legal Reasoning: "It is the basic principle of law long settled that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all."
• Core Principles Established: The judgment reinforced the principle that statutory limitations must be strictly adhered to and cannot be circumvented by executive actions or sanctions.
• Final Determinations on Each Issue: The Court held that the disciplinary proceedings were time-barred and thus invalid. The High Court's judgment was set aside, but the Court exercised its power under Article 142 of the Constitution to allow the Respondents to continue the proceedings within six months, provided they adhere to the law and principles of natural justice.