2010 (1) TMI 272 - HC - Income Tax

Delay in filing the appeal- Whether the delay in filing of the appeal beyond the period of 120 days prescribed by section 260A (2) (a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, could be condoned by entertaining an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963? Held that- whenever the legislature desired to provide for condonation of delay specific provisions has been made in the Income Tax Act, 1961, and, therefore if no such provision has been made, then no application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 could be filed as the Act itself as a complete code. Delay in filing the appeal beyond the period of 120 days prescribed by section 260A(2)(a) Act could not be condoned by entertaining an application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act.

Summary

Issues:
1. Whether delay in filing the appeal beyond the prescribed period could be condoned by entertaining an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963?

Analysis:

1. The judgment addressed the issue of condonation of delay in filing appeals under section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The court considered the appeals challenging a common order passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, which dismissed the appeals filed by various cooperative societies on the ground of being time-barred. The main question for determination was whether delay beyond the prescribed period could be condoned by invoking section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

2. The appeals involved applications invoking section 5 of the Limitation Act, seeking condonation of a 74-day delay in filing the appeals. The court referred to a judgment by the Supreme Court in a case related to the Central Excise Act, emphasizing that where a special law provides for limitation, the provisions of the Limitation Act may not apply. The court examined the language of relevant sections in the Excise Act to conclude that the Limitation Act was excluded.

3. The court further analyzed the provisions of the Income-tax Act, noting that specific provisions for condonation of delay were included in certain sections. Drawing parallels with the Excise Act, the court held that if the Act does not provide for condonation of delay, applications under section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be accepted. The court relied on the Supreme Court's reasoning in a previous case to support this conclusion.

4. Consequently, the court dismissed the applications seeking condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act, leading to the dismissal of the appeals as time-barred. The judgment emphasized that the Act, like the Excise Act, is considered a complete code, and in the absence of specific provisions for condonation of delay, applications under the Limitation Act cannot be entertained.