1998 (2) TMI 209 - AT - Central Excise

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Time-barred refund claim.
2. Provisional assessment under Rule 9B.
3. Consideration of advance deposits as duty.
4. Procedural irregularities affecting substantive rights.
5. Validity of letters as refund claims.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Time-barred Refund Claim:
The primary issue was whether the refund claim filed by the assessee was time-barred. The Commissioner (Appeals) confirmed the Order-in-Original, holding that the refund claim related to the period 22-2-1992 to 21-5-1992 and was filed on 17-8-1993, thus time-barred. The appellants contended that the final assessment was made in February-March 1993, and hence the claim was within six months from the final assessment. The Tribunal noted that the formal refund claim was filed on 17-8-1993, but earlier letters dated 15-9-1992 to 29-9-1992 should be considered as refund claims, thus not time-barred.

2. Provisional Assessment under Rule 9B:
The appellants argued that the deposits made under the directions of the Range Superintendent should be treated as provisional assessments under Rule 9B. The Commissioner held that the assessment could not be considered provisional as the procedure under Rule 9B was not followed. The Tribunal, however, acknowledged that the final assessment was made on the RT-12 returns for February and March 1993, and hence the claim should be within the limitation period if treated from that date.

3. Consideration of Advance Deposits as Duty:
The appellants contended that the amounts deposited were advances and not duty, invoking Section 11B(ii)(b) for calculating the six-month period from the final assessment. The Revenue argued that the deposits in the PLA were duty deposits, not advances. The Tribunal recognized that the credits made in the PLA were for duty payment for the clearance of sugar and not merely advances, but still considered the earlier letters as valid refund claims.

4. Procedural Irregularities Affecting Substantive Rights:
The appellants argued that non-following procedural requirements should not annihilate their substantive rights to claim a refund. They relied on precedents where procedural violations did not affect substantive rights. The Tribunal agreed, noting that non-following Rule 233B was a procedural violation and did not affect the substantive right to claim a refund.

5. Validity of Letters as Refund Claims:
The Tribunal had to determine whether the letters dated 15-9-1992 to 29-9-1992 could be considered as refund claims. Citing precedents, the Tribunal noted that informal communications expressing the intent to claim a refund could be treated as valid refund claims. The Tribunal concluded that these letters should be considered as refund claims, thus making the formal claim filed on 17-8-1993 a continuation of the earlier claims.

Conclusion:
The Tribunal set aside the impugned order and remanded the case for reconsideration of the refund claim in terms of law, recognizing the earlier letters as valid refund claims and acknowledging the substantive rights of the assessee despite procedural irregularities.